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Abstract—Election verifiability is defined in the computational
model of cryptography. The definition formalizes notions of voters
verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes,
and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios
(Adida et al., 2009), Helios-C (Cortier et al., 2014) and JCJ (Juels
et al., 2010) election schemes are analyzed using the definition.
Neither Helios nor Helios-C satisfy the definition because they
fail to ensure that recorded ballots are tallied in certain cases
when the adversary posts malicious material on the bulletin
board. A variant of Helios is proposed and shown to satisfy the
definition. JCJ does not satisfy the definition because of a trust
assumption it makes, but it does satisfy a weakened definition.
Two previous definitions of verifiability (Juels et al., 2010; Cortier
et al., 2014) are shown to permit election schemes vulnerable to
attacks, whereas the new definition prohibits those schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting systems that have been deployed in real-
world, large-scale public elections place extensive trust in soft-
ware and hardware. Unfortunately, instead of being trustwor-
thy, many systems are vulnerable to attacks that could bring
election outcomes into disrepute [25], [63], [80], [121]. So
relying solely on trust in voting systems is unwise; verification
of election outcomes is essential.1
Election verifiability enables voters and auditors to ascertain
the correctness of election outcomes, regardless of whether
the software and hardware of the voting system are trustwor-
thy [1], [2], [33], [81], [104]. Kremer et al. [89] decompose
election verifiability into three aspects:2
• Individual verifiability: voters can check that their own
ballots are recorded.
• Universal verifiability: anyone can check that the tally of
recorded ballots is computed properly.
• Eligibility verifiability: anyone can check that each tallied
vote was cast by an authorized voter.
We propose new definitions of these three aspects of ver-
ifiability in the computational model of cryptography. We
show that individual and universal verifiability are orthogonal,
and that eligibility verifiability implies individual verifiability.
Because some electronic voting systems implement voter
authentication themselves, whereas other systems outsource
voter authentication to third parties, we develop two variants of
our definitions—one for systems with internal authentication
and another for systems with external authentication.
We employ our definitions to analyze the verifiability of two
well-known election schemes, JCJ [83] and Helios [5]. JCJ
is an election scheme that achieves coercion resistance and
has been implemented as Civitas [37]; it implements its own
internal authentication. Helios is a web-based voting system
that has been deployed in the real-world and outsources au-
thentication. We also analyze the verifiability of Helios-C [41],
a variant of Helios that implements internal authentication by
digitally signing ballots.
The Helios 2.0 election scheme is known to have vul-
nerabilities that can be exploited to violate ballot secrecy
and verifiability [21], [44], [45], and the specification for
the next Helios release [4], henceforth Helios’12, is intended
to mitigate against those vulnerabilities. Our analysis shows
that the mitigations are insufficient to ensure verifiability. In
particular, an adversary could record a ballot that causes a
voter’s ballot to be omitted from tallying. A variant of Helios,
henceforth Helios’16, is proposed, and shown to satisfy our
definition of election verifiability with external authentication.
Helios 2.0 and Helios’12 fail to satisfy our definition.
Our analysis of Helios-C reveals that an adversary could
record an ill-formed ballot that causes tallying to abort in
a manner that anyone will accept. Yet, our definition of
universal verifiability demands that accepted outcomes include
the choices used to construct any well-formed ballots. Hence,
each voter can be assured that their choice contributed to
1. Doveryai, no proveryai (trust, but verify) says the Russian proverb.
2. This decomposition has been criticized [93]; we refute that criticism in
Section VIII.
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the outcome. By comparison, Helios-C does not assure this,
because ill-formed ballots cause tallying to abort and that abort
will be accepted. Thus, Helios-C does not satisfy our defini-
tion of universal verifiability. Nevertheless, a straightforward
variant of Helios-C that disregards ill-formed ballots would
satisfy our definition.
The JCJ election scheme does not satisfy our definition
of eligibility verifiability, because an adversary who learns
the tallier’s private key could cast unauthorized votes. We
introduce a weakened definition of eligibility verifiability,
incorporating JCJ’s trust assumption that the private key is
not known to the adversary, and show that JCJ satisfies
our weakened definition of election verifiability with internal
authentication.
Our definitions of election verifiability improve upon two
previous definitions [41], [83] by detecting a new class of
collusion attacks, in which the tallying algorithm announces
an incorrect tally, and the verification algorithm colludes with
the tallying algorithm to accept the incorrect tally. Examples
of collusion attacks include vote stuffing, and announcing
tallies that are independent of the election. Our definitions
also improve upon those previous definitions by detecting
a new class of biasing attacks, in which the verification
algorithm rejects some legitimate election outcomes. Examples
of biasing attacks include rejecting outcomes in which a
particular candidate does not win, and rejecting all election
outcomes, even correct outcomes.
This paper thus contributes to the security of electronic
voting systems by:
• proposing computational definitions of election verifiabil-
ity;
• showing that individual, universal, and eligibility verifia-
bility are mostly orthogonal properties of voting systems;
• proving that Helios 2.0, Helios’12 and Helios-C do not
satisfy election verifiability, and that Helios’16 and JCJ
do; and
• identifying collusion and biasing attacks as new classes
of attacks on voting systems and demonstrating that they
are not detected by two earlier definitions.
Our definitions are sufficient to analyze Helios 2.0, Helios’12,
Helios’16, Helios-C, and JCJ. They correctly indentify Helios
2.0, Helios’12, and Helios-C as not satisfying verifiability.
And they enable the first proofs that Helios’16 and JCJ satisfy
a computational definition of verifiability. Although some
protocols may fall outside the scope of our definitions, we
have shown that they are sufficiently general to be useful.
Structure: Section II defines election verifiability with ex-
ternal authentication. Section III analyzes Helios. Section IV
defines election verifiability with internal authentication. Sec-
tion V analyzes Helios-C. Section VI analyzes JCJ. Sec-
tion VII introduces collusion and biasing attacks. Section VIII
reviews related work and Section IX concludes. Appendix A
defines cryptographic primitives. The remaining appendices
explore alternative definitions of verifiability, give the details
of Helios and JCJ, and present proofs.
II. EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION
Some election schemes do not implement authentication
themselves, but instead rely on an external authentication
mechanism. Helios, for example, supports authentication with
Facebook, Google and Yahoo credentials.3 In essence, the
election scheme outsources ballot authentication. We begin by
defining election verifiability for that model.
A. Election scheme
An election scheme with external authentication, which
henceforth in this section we abbreviate as “election scheme,”
is a tuple (Setup,Vote,Tally,Verify) of probabilistic polyno-
mial-time (PPT) algorithms:
• Setup, denoted4 (PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k), is
executed by the tallier, who is responsible for tallying
ballots.5 Setup takes a security parameter k as input and
outputs a key pair (PK T , SK T ), a maximum number of
ballots mB , and a maximum number of candidates mC .6
• Vote, denoted b ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k), is executed
by voters. A voter makes a choice of candidate from
a sequence c1, . . . , cnC of candidates. A well-formed
choice is an integer β, such that 1 ≤ β ≤ nC . Vote takes
as input the public key PK T of the tallier, the number
nC of candidates, the voter’s choice β of candidate, and
security parameter k. It outputs a ballot b, or error symbol
⊥. An error might occur if the candidate choice is not
well-formed or for other reasons particular to the election
scheme.
• Tally, denoted (X, P ) ← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k), is
executed by the tallier. It involves a public bulletin board
BB , which we model as a set.7 Tally takes as input the
private key SK T of the tallier, the bulletin board BB ,
the number of candidates nC , and security parameter k.
It outputs a tally X and a non-interactive proof P that the
tally is correct. A tally is a vector X of length nC such
that X[j] indicates the number of votes for candidate cj .8
• Verify, denoted v ← Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k), can
be executed by anyone to audit the election. Verify takes
3. https://github.com/benadida/helios-server/tree/master/helios auth/auth
systems, accessed 4 Aug 2015.
4. Let Alg(in; r) denote the output of probabilistic algorithm Alg on input
in and random coins r. Let Alg(in) denote Alg(in; r), where r is chosen
uniformly at random. And let ← denote assignment.
5. Some election schemes (e.g., Helios, Helios-C, and JCJ) permit the
tallier’s role to be distributed amongst several talliers. For simplicity, we
consider only a single tallier in this paper.
6. The maximum ballots and candidate numbers are used to formalize
Correctness. Helios requires that the maximum number of ballots is less than
or equal to the size of the underlying encryption scheme’s message space, and
JCJ requires that the maximum number of candidates is less than or equal to
the size of the underlying encryption scheme’s message space.
7. Bulletin boards have also been modeled as public broadcast chan-
nels [48], [105], [108]. We abstract from the details of channels by employing
sets to represent the data sent on them. We favor sets over multisets, because
Cortier and Smyth [44], [45] demonstrate attacks against privacy when the
bulletin board is modeled as a multiset.
8. Let X[i] denote component i of vector X.
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as input the public key PK T of the tallier, the bulletin
board BB , the number of candidates nC , a tally X, a
proof P of correct tallying, and security parameter k. It
outputs a bit v, which is 1 if the tally successfully verifies
and 0 otherwise. We assume that Verify is deterministic.
Election schemes must satisfy Correctness, which asserts
that tallies produced by Tally corresponds to the choices input
to Vote:
Definition 1 (Correctness). There exists a negligible function
µ, such that for all security parameters k, integers nB and
nC , and choices β1, . . . , βnB ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, it holds that
if Y is a vector of length nC whose components are all 0, then
Pr[(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nB do
bi ← Vote(PK T , nC , βi, k);
Y[βi]← Y[βi] + 1;
BB ← {b1, . . . , bnB};
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k) :
nB ≤ mB ∧ nC ≤ mC ⇒ X = Y] > 1− µ(k).
Note that Correctness does not involve an adversary. Correct-
ness therefore stipulates that, under ideal conditions, an elec-
tion scheme does indeed produce the correct tally. Correctness
is not actually necessary to achieve verifiability: our definition
of universal verifiability will ensure that, in the presence of
an adversary, Verify detects any errors in the tally. But it is
reasonable to rule out election schemes that simply do not
work properly under ideal conditions.
Election schemes must also satisfy Completeness, which
stipulates that tallies produced by Tally will actually be
accepted by Verify:
Definition 2 (Completeness). There exists a negligible func-
tion µ, such that for all security parameters k, bulletin boards
BB , and integers nC , it holds that
Pr[(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k) :
|BB | ≤ mB ∧ nC ≤ mC ⇒
Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) = 1] > 1− µ(k).
Without Completeness, election schemes might be vulnerable
to biasing attacks, as we show in Section VII-B.
Finally, election schemes must satisfy Injectivity, which
asserts that a ballot cannot be interpreted as a vote for more
than one candidate:
Definition 3 (Injectivity). For all security parameters k, public
keys PK T , integers nC , and choices β and β′, such that β 6=
β′, we have
Pr[b← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k);
b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β′, k) :
b 6= ⊥ ∧ b′ 6= ⊥ ⇒ b 6= b′] = 1.
Injectivity ensures that distinct choices are not mapped by
Vote to the same ballot. Without Injectivity, an election
scheme might produce ballots whose meaning is ambiguous.
For example, if Vote(PK T , nC , β, k; r) were defined to be
β + r, then a ballot b could be tallied as any well-formed
choice β′ such that β′ = b−r′ for some r′. But that definition
of Vote is prohibited by Injectivity. Thus, Injectivity helps
to ensure that the choices used to construct ballots can be
uniquely tallied.
Limitations: Our model of election schemes is sufficient
to analyze Helios and, after we extend the model to handle
internal authentication in Section IV-A, Helios-C and JCJ.
These are notable schemes, and formally analyzing their
verifiability is a novel contribution. But there are other notable
schemes that fall outside our model:
• Pret a` Voter [33], MarkPledge [100], Scantegrity II [30],
and Remotegrity [122] all rely on features implemented
with paper, such as scratch-off surfaces and detachable
columns.
• Everlasting privacy [98], which requires Vote to output
a public ballot and a secret proof, involving temporal
information, to the voter.
• Scytl’s Pnyx.core ODBP 1.0 [36], which requires the
bulletin board to be divided into two parts: a public part
visible to all participants, and a secret part visible only
to election administrators.
We leave extension of our model to other election schemes as
future work.
B. Election verifiability
Election verifiability comprises three aspects: individual,
universal, and eligibility verifiability. We express each as an
experiment, which is an algorithm that outputs 0 or 1. The
adversary wins an experiment by causing it to output 1.
1) Individual verifiability: In our model of election
schemes, all recorded ballots are posted on the bulletin board.
So for a voter to verify that their ballot has been recorded, it
suffices to enable them to uniquely identify their ballot on the
bulletin board.9
Individual verifiability experiment Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k),
where Π denotes an election scheme, A denotes the adversary,
and k denotes a security parameter, therefore challenges A to
generate a scenario in which the voter cannot uniquely identify
their ballot. In essence, Exp-IV-Ext challenges A to generate
a collision from Vote.10 If A cannot win, then voters can
uniquely identify their ballots on the bulletin board:
Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k) =
9. Section IX addresses the complementary issue of whether a recorded
ballot corresponds to the candidate choice a voter intended to make.
10. Exp-IV-Ext can be equivalently formulated as an experiment that chal-
lenges A to predict the output of Vote. See Appendix B for details.
3
(PK T , nC , β, β′)← A(k);1
b← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k);2
b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β′, k);3
if b = b′ ∧ b 6= ⊥ ∧ b′ 6= ⊥ then4
return 15
else6
return 07
Line 1 asks A to compute two candidate choices β and β′,
such that ballots b and b′ for those choices, as computed by
Vote in lines 2 and 3, are equal. Individual verifiability thus
resembles Injectivity, but individual verifiability allows choices
to be equal and allows A to choose election parameters.
One way to achieve individual verifiability is to base the
election scheme on a probabilistic encryption scheme, such as
El Gamal [58]. Intuitively, if Vote encrypts the choice using
random coins, then it is overwhelmingly unlikely that two
votes will result in the same ballot. Our proofs that Helios,
Helios-C and JCJ satisfy individual verifiability are based on
this idea.
Clash attacks: In a clash attack [95], the adversary con-
vinces some voters that a single ballot belongs to all of them.
Some clash attacks are possible because of vulnerabilities
in the design of Vote. For example, if Vote simply outputs
candidate choice β, then a voter has no way to distinguish
their vote for β from another voter’s vote for β. Exp-IV-Ext
detects clash attacks resulting from vulnerabilities in Vote.
Some clash attacks, however, are possible because the
adversary subverts the implementation of Vote. For example,
the adversary might replace some hardware or software, or
compromise the random number generator. If any one of
these aspects is compromised, then Vote has effectively been
changed to a different algorithm Vote′. The conclusions drawn
by a security analyst who uses our definition of individual ver-
ifiability to analyze Vote would not necessarily be applicable
to Vote′.
In short, a voter can verify that their ballot has been recorded
if and only if they run the correct Vote algorithm. We make
no guarantees to voters that do not run the correct Vote
algorithm. One way to make stronger guarantees is to use cut-
and-choose protocols to audit ballots [15], [16]. This would
require modeling voting as an interactive protocol with the
adversary, rather than as an algorithm. We leave this extension
as future work.
2) Universal verifiability: For an election to be universally
verifiable, anyone must be able to check that a tally is correct
with respect to recorded ballots—that is, the tally represents
the choices used to construct the recorded ballots. Because
anyone can execute Verify, it suffices that Verify accepts only
when that property holds.
Universal verifiability experiment Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k)
therefore challenges adversary A to concoct a scenario in
which Verify incorrectly accepts:
Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k) =
(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P )← A(k);1
Y ← correct-tally(PK T ,BB , nC , k);2
if X 6= Y ∧ Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) = 1 then3
return 14
else5
return 06
In line 1, A is challenged to create a bulletin board BB and
purported tally X of that bulletin board. Line 2 constructs
the correct tally Y of BB , and line 3 checks whether Verify
accepts an incorrect tally. If A cannot win Exp-UV-Ext, then
Verify will not accept incorrect tallies. In particular, no ballots
can be omitted from the tally, and at most one candidate choice
can be included in the tally for each ballot.
Let function correct-tally be defined such that for all PK T ,
BB , nC , k, `, and β ∈ {1, . . . , nC},
correct-tally(PK T ,BB , nC , k)[β] = `
⇐⇒ ∃=`b ∈ (BB \ {⊥}) :
∃r : b = Vote(PK T , nC , β, k; r).
The vector produced by correct-tally must be of length
nC . Component β of vector correct-tally(PK T ,BB , nC , k)
equals ` iff there exist11 ` ballots on the bulletin board
that are votes for candidate β. It follows that the output
of correct-tally represents the choices used to construct the
recorded ballots. Note that, without Injectivity, the existential
quantification in correct-tally could permit a ballot to be
tallied for more than one candidate. Of course, correct-tally
cannot be computed by a PPT algorithm for typical crypto-
graphic election schemes. But that does not matter, because
correct-tally is never actually computed as part of an election
scheme—its use is solely in the definition of Exp-UV-Ext.12
Security analysts must convince themselves that
correct-tally is indeed correct. Because of the function’s
simplicity, this should be relatively straightforward. By
comparison, Tally algorithms for real voting schemes tend
to be complicated. For example, compare the complexity of
correct-tally to Helios’s Tally algorithm, which appears in
Figure 1 of Appendix C.
By design, Exp-UV-Ext assumes that the ballots on bulletin
board BB are exactly the ballots that should be tallied.
The external authentication mechanism is assumed to prohibit
unauthorized ballots from being posted on BB . Helios makes
such an assumption about its external authentication mecha-
nism.
3) Eligibility verifiability: For an election to satisfy eligi-
bility verifiability, anyone must be able to check that every
tallied vote was cast by an authorized voter—hence, it must
be possible to authenticate ballots. In election schemes with
11. The definition of correct-tally employs a counting quantifier [110]
denoted ∃=. Predicate (∃=`x : P (x)) holds exactly when there are ` distinct
values for x such that P (x) is satisfied. Variable x is bound by the quantifier,
whereas ` is free.
12. Kiayias et al. [87] use a similar super-polynomial vote extractor to
recover choices from ballots in an experiment defining verifiability.
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external authentication, a trusted third party authenticates
ballots. That third party might convince itself that all tallied
ballots have been authenticated, but it cannot convince all other
parties. Eligibility verifiability, therefore, is not achievable in
election schemes with external authentication.
4) Election verifiability: With Exp-IV-Ext and
Exp-UV-Ext, we define election verifiability with external
authentication. Let a PPT adversary’s success Succ(Exp(·))
in an experiment Exp(·) be the probability that the adversary
wins—that is, Succ(Exp(·)) = Pr[Exp(·) = 1].
Definition 4 (Ver-Ext). An election scheme Π satisfies elec-
tion verifiability with external authentication (Ver-Ext) if for
all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function
µ, such that for all security parameters k, it holds that
Succ(Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k)) + Succ(Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k)) ≤
µ(k).
An election scheme satisfies individual verifiability if
Succ(Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k), and similarly for univer-
sal verifiability.
C. Example—Toy scheme from nonces
A toy election scheme satisfying Ver-Ext can be based on
nonces. Each voter publishes a nonce paired with her choice
of candidate to the bulletin board. This scheme illustrates the
essence of election verifiability, even though it does not offer
any privacy.
Definition 5. Election scheme Nonce is defined as follows:
• Setup(k) outputs (⊥,⊥, p1(k), p2(k)), where p1 and p2
may be any polynomial functions.
• Vote(PK T , nC , β, k) selects a nonce r uniformly at
random from Z2k and outputs (r, β).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k) computes a vector X of length
nC , such that X is a tally of the votes on BB for which
the nonce is in Z2k , and outputs (X,⊥).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) outputs 1 if (X, P ) =
Tally(⊥,BB , nC , k), and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1. Nonce satisfies Ver-Ext.
Proof sketch. Nonce satisfies individual verifiability, because
voters can use their nonce to check that their own ballot
appears on the bulletin board. With overwhelming probability,
Vote will select unique nonces for each voter, hence generate
distinct ballots. Nonce also satisfies universal verifiability,
because plaintext candidate choices are posted on the bulletin
board.
D. Orthogonality
Exp-IV-Ext and Exp-UV-Ext capture orthogonal security
properties. A scheme that satisfies individual verifiability but
violates universal verifiability can be constructed from Nonce
by modifying Verify to always output 1. Voters can still check
that their own ballot appears. But an adversary can easily win
Exp-UV-Ext, because Verify will accept any tally. A scheme
that satisfies universal verifiability but violates individual
verifiability can be constructed from Nonce by removing the
nonces, leaving just the voter’s choice in the ballots. Call
that scheme Choice. Anyone can still verify the tally of the
election, but an adversary can easily win Exp-IV-Ext, because
two votes for the same candidate will collide.
III. CASE STUDY: HELIOS
Helios [5] is an open-source, web-based electronic voting
system,13 which has been deployed in the real-world. The
International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR) has
used Helios annually since 2010 to elect board members [18],
[70], [77], the Catholic University of Louvain used Helios to
elect the university president [5], and Princeton University has
used Helios to elect several student governments [3], [102].
Helios is intended to satisfy verifiability whilst maintain-
ing ballot secrecy—i.e., without revealing voters’ votes. For
ballot secrecy, voters encrypt candidate choices using a ho-
momorphic encryption scheme, these encrypted choices are
homomorphically combined, and the tallier decrypts the ho-
momorphic combination to reveal the tally.14 For verifiability,
encryption and decryption steps are accompanied by zero-
knowledge proofs.
Informally, Helios works as follows:
• Setup. The tallier generates a key pair for a homomorphic
encryption scheme and publishes the public key.
• Voting. A voter encrypts her candidate choice with the
tallier’s public key, and proves in zero-knowledge that the
ciphertext contains a well-formed choice. The voter posts
her ballot (i.e., ciphertext and proof) on the bulletin board.
(The bulletin board is assumed to correctly authenticate
voters during posting.)
• Tallying. The tallier discards any ballots from the bulletin
board for which proofs do not hold. The tallier homomor-
phically combines the ciphertexts in the remaining bal-
lots, decrypts the homomorphic combination, and proves
in zero-knowledge that decryption was performed cor-
rectly. Finally, the tallier publishes the winning candidate
and proof of correct decryption.
• Verification. A verifier recomputes the homomorphic
combination and checks all the zero-knowledge proofs.
Helios was first implemented as Helios 2.0.15,16
Vulnerabilities have been discovered against Helios 2.0, and
mitigations against those vulnerabilities have been proposed.
13. https://vote.heliosvoting.org/, accessed 16 Nov 2015.
14. Homomorphic combination of ciphertexts is straightforward for two-
candidate elections [14], [19], [38], [74], [107], since choices (e.g., “yes”
or “no”) can be encoded as 1 or 0. Multi-candidate elections are also
possible [19], [52], [73].
15. https://github.com/benadida/helios/releases/tag/2.0, released 25 Jul 2009,
accessed 16 Nov 2015.
16. Helios 2.0 builds upon Helios 1.0 [2]. But, the two systems are rather
different. In particular, the Helios 2.0 tallier homomorphically combines
encrypted choices and decrypts the homomorphic combination to reveal the
tally, whereas the Helios 1.0 tallier mixes encrypted choices and decrypts the
ciphertexts output by the mix.
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• Verifiability exploits are attributed to application of the
Fiat–Shamir transformation without inclusion of state-
ments in hashes (i.e., the weak Fiat–Shamir transforma-
tion), and including statements in hashes (i.e., applying
the Fiat–Shamir transformation) is postulated as a de-
fense [21].
• Ballot secrecy exploits are attributed to tallying meaning-
fully related ballots,17 and omitting such ballots from the
tally (i.e., ballot weeding) is postulated as a defense [44],
[45], [112], [115], [116], [118].
Given the verifiability exploits, we would not expect Ver-Ext
to hold for Helios 2.0. Indeed, we formalize a generic
construction for Helios-like election schemes (Appendix C),
which we instantiate to derive a formal description of Helios
2.0 (Appendix D). And using that description, we can prove
that Helios 2.0 is not verifiable:
Proposition 2. Helios 2.0 does not satisfy Ver-Ext.
The proof of Proposition 2 appears in Appendix D.
The specification for the next Helios release (Helios’12) is
intended to mitigate against vulnerabilities [4].18 In particular,
it incorporates the Fiat–Shamir transformation (rather than the
weak Fiat–Shamir transformation). And it incorporates ballot
weeding: any ballot containing a previously observed hash
is omitted from the tally. Although ballot weeding can be
sufficient for ballot secrecy (cf. [113, §6]), we have found that
it violates universal verifiability. In particular, an adversary
can observe a voter’s ballot and cast a related ballot, such
that the voter’s ballot is omitted from tallying. (This could be
achieved, for example, by manipulating the bulletin board to
ensure observation of the adversary’s ballot before the voter’s
ballot, since this causes the voter’s ballot to be weeded.)
Our definition of universal verifiability requires all ballots on
the bulletin board to be tallied, thus it is violated by ballot
weeding. It follows that Helios’12 does not satisfy Ver-Ext,
because that scheme relies upon ballot weeding to defend
against ballot secrecy violations.
Remark 3. Helios’12 does not satisfy Ver-Ext.
Proof sketch. Helios’12 uses ballot weeding, which violates
universal verifiability, as described above.
An informal proof of Remark 3 follows immediately from our
discourse. A formal proof would require a formal description
of Helios’12. Such a formal description can be derived as a
straight-forward variant of Helios 2.0 that applies the Fiat–
Shamir transformation (rather than the weak Fiat–Shamir
transformation) and uses ballot weeding. These details provide
little value, so we do not pursue them further.
To ensure universal verifiability, we propose Helios’16, a
variant of Helios’12. Our variant defends against ballot secrecy
violations by incorporating proposals by Smyth et al. [119] and
Smyth [113] for non-malleable ballots, rather than proposals
for ballot weeding. We give a formal description of Helios’16
in Appendix E. Using that formalization, we can prove that
Helios’16 is verifiable:
Theorem 4. Helios’16 satisfies Ver-Ext.
Proof sketch. Helios’16 satisfies individual verifiability, be-
cause the probabilistic encryption scheme ensures that ballots
are unique, with overwhelming probability. And Helios’16
satisfies universal verifiability, because the zero-knowledge
proofs can be publicly verified.
A formal proof of Theorem 4 appears in Appendix F. The
proof assumes the random oracle model [11]. This proof
provides strong motivation for future Helios releases being
based upon Helios’16.
IV. INTERNAL AUTHENTICATION
Some election schemes implement their own authentication
mechanisms. JCJ [81]–[83] and Civitas [37], for example,
authenticate ballots based on credentials issued to voters by
a registration authority. Schemes with this kind of internal
authentication enable verification of whether tallied ballots
were cast by authorized voters.
A. Election scheme
A registrar is responsible for issuing authentication creden-
tials to voters.19 Each voter is associated with a credential pair
(pk , sk). The voter uses private credential sk to construct
a ballot. Public credential pk is used during tallying and
verification. Let L denote the electoral roll, which is the set
of all public credentials.
An election scheme with internal authentication, which
henceforth in this section we abbreviate as “election scheme,”
is a tuple (Setup,Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) of PPT algo-
rithms. The algorithms are now denoted as follows:
• (PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k)
• (pk , sk)← Register(PK T , k)
• b← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k)
• (X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k)
• v ← Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X, P, k)
Setup is unchanged from election schemes with external
authentication (cf. §II-A). The only change to Vote is that it
now accepts private credential sk as input. Similarly, the only
change to Tally and Verify is that they now accept electoral
roll L as input. Register is executed by the registrar. It takes as
input the public key PK T of the tallier and security parameter
k, and it outputs a credential pair (pk , sk). After all voters
have been registered, the registrar certifies the electoral roll,
perhaps by digitally signing and publishing it.20
17. Meaningfully related ballots can be constructed because Helios ballots
are malleable.
18. The current version of Helios, Helios 3.1.4 (https://github.com/benadida/
helios-server/releases/tag/v3.1.4, released 10 Mar 2011, accessed 19 Aug
2015), predates the discovery of verifiability exploits, hence, it is vulnerable.
19. Some election schemes (e.g., Helios-C and JCJ) permit the registrar’s
role to be distributed among several registrars. For simplicity, we consider
only a single registrar in this paper.
20. It might seem surprising that Register does not require the registrar to
provide any private keys as input. But in constructions of election schemes
with internal authentication, e.g., [37], [83], the registrar does not sign
credential pairs with its own private key. Rather, the registrar signs the
electoral roll.
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Election schemes must continue to satisfy Correctness,
Completeness, and Injectivity, which we update to include
private credentials and the electoral roll:
Definition 6 (Correctness). There exists a negligible function
µ, such that for all security parameters k, integers nB and
nC , and choices β1, . . . , βnB ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, it holds that
if Y is a vector of length nC whose components are all 0, then
Pr[(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nB do
(pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k);
bi ← Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , βi, k);
Y[βi]← Y[βi] + 1;
L← {pk1, . . . , pknB};
BB ← {b1, . . . , bnB};
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k) :
nB ≤ mB ∧ nC ≤ mC ⇒ X = Y] > 1− µ(k).
Definition 7 (Completeness). There exists a negligible func-
tion µ, such that for all security parameters k, bulletin boards
BB , and integers nC and nV , it holds that
Pr[(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k);
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k) :
|BB | ≤ mB ∧ nC ≤ mC ⇒
Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X, P, k) = 1] > 1− µ(k).
Definition 8 (Injectivity). For all security parameters k, public
keys PK T , integers nC , and choices β and β′, such that β 6=
β′, we have
Pr[(pk , sk)← Register(PK T , k);
(pk ′, sk ′)← Register(PK T , k);
b← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k);
b′ ← Vote(sk ′,PK T , nC , β′, k) :
b 6= ⊥ ∧ b′ 6= ⊥ ⇒ b 6= b′] = 1.
B. Election verifiability
Recall (from §II-B) that election verifiability is expressed
with experiments, and that an adversary wins by causing an
experiment to output 1. We henceforth assume that the adver-
sary is stateful—that is, information persists across invocations
of the adversary in a single experiment. Our experiments in
Section II did not need this assumption, because they never
invoked the adversary more than once.
In our experiments, below, we model an adversary who
cannot corrupt the registration process that issues credentials
to voters.21 Hence our definitions will not detect attacks
against verifiability that result solely from weaknesses in the
registration process. Secure construction of electoral rolls is
not a topic that electronic voting usually addresses—though it
seems an important part of any real-world deployment.
1) Individual verifiability: The individual verifiability ex-
periment again challenges adversary A to generate a scenario
in which the voter could not uniquely identify their ballot:22
Exp-IV-Int(Π,A, k) =
(PK T , nV )← A(k);1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k)2
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };3
Crpt ← ∅;4
(nC , β, β
′, i, j)← AC(L);5
b← Vote(ski,PK T , nC , β, k);6
b′ ← Vote(skj ,PK T , nC , β′, k);7
if8
b = b′∧b 6= ⊥∧b′ 6= ⊥∧ i 6= j∧sk i 6∈ Crpt ∧sk j 6∈ Crpt
then
return 19
else10
return 011
The main differences from the corresponding experiment for
external authentication (§II-B1) are that voters are registered in
line 2, and that A is given access to an oracle C in line 5. The
oracle is used to model A corrupting voters and learning their
private credentials: on invocation C(`), where 1 ≤ ` ≤ nV ,
the oracle records that voter ` is corrupted by updating Crpt
to be Crpt∪{sk `} and outputs sk `. In line 5, the voter indices
output by A must be legal with respect to nV , but we elide
that detail from the experiment for simplicity. Line 8 ensures
that A cannot trivially win by corrupting voters.
2) Universal verifiability: The universal verifiability exper-
iment again challenges A to concoct a scenario in which Verify
incorrectly accepts:
Exp-UV-Int(Π,A, k) =
(PK T , nV )← A(k);1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k)2
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };3
M ← {(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pknV , sknV )};4
(BB , nC ,X, P )← A(M);5
Y ← correct-tally(PK T ,BB ,M, nC , k);6
if X 6= Y ∧ Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X, P, k) = 1 then7
return 18
else9
return 010
The main differences from the corresponding experiment for
external authentication (§II-B2) are that voters are registered
in line 2, and their credential pairs are used in the rest of the
experiment.
The tally of recorded ballots should contain at most one vote
per voter. Hence, election schemes must handle revotes—i.e.,
multiple ballots submitted by the same voter. Election schemes
21. Ku¨sters and Truderung [91] explore some consequences of permitting
adversarial influence during registration.
22. Unlike Exp-IV-Ext, a variant of Exp-IV-Int that challenges A to predict
the output of Vote is strictly stronger. See Appendix B for details.
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with external authentication implicitly handle revoting, by
assuming a third party ensures that the recorded ballots contain
at most one ballot per voter. Election schemes with internal
authentication must explicitly handle revoting by tallying only
authorized ballots. A ballot is authorized if it is constructed
with a private credential from M , and that private credential
was not used to construct any other ballot on BB .23,24
Function correct-tally is now modified to tally only autho-
rized ballots: let function correct-tally now be defined such
that for all PK T , BB , M , nC , k, `, and β ∈ {1, . . . , nC},
correct-tally(PK T ,BB ,M, nC , k)[β] = `
⇐⇒ ∃=`b ∈ authorized(PK T , (BB \ {⊥}),M, nC , k) :
∃sk , r : b = Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k; r).
By comparison, the original correct-tally function (§II-B2)
tallies all the ballots on BB .
Let authorized be defined as follows:
authorized(PK T ,BB ,M, nC , k) =
{b : b ∈ BB
∧ ∃pk , sk , β, r : b = Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k; r)
∧ (pk , sk) ∈M ∧ ¬∃b′, β′, r′ : b′ ∈ (BB \ {b})
∧ b′ = Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β′, k; r′)}.
Function authorized discards ballots submitted under the
same credential—that is, if there is more than one ballot
submitted with a private credential sk , then all ballots sub-
mitted under that credential are discarded. Therefore, elec-
tion schemes that permit revoting cannot by analyzed with
this definition of authorized . But alternative definitions of
authorized are possible—for example, if ballots were times-
tamped, authorized could discard all but the most recent ballot
submitted under a particular credential.
3) Eligibility verifiability: Recall (from §II-B3) that for
an election scheme to satisfy eligibility verifiability, anyone
must be able to check that every tallied vote was cast by an
authorized voter—hence, it must be possible to authenticate
ballots. Because voters are issued credential pairs that can
be used to authenticate ballots, it suffices to ensure that
knowledge of a private credential is necessary to construct
an authentic ballot.
Eligibility verifiability experiment Exp-EV-Int therefore
challenges A to produce a ballot under a private credential
that A does not know:
Exp-EV-Int(Π,A, k) =
(PK T , nV )← A(k);1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k);2
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };3
Crpt ← ∅; Rvld ← ∅;4
(nC , β, i, b)← AC,R(L);5
if ∃r : b = Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , β, k; r) ∧ b 6= ⊥ ∧ b 6∈6
Rvld ∧ ski 6∈ Crpt then
return 17
else8
return 09
In line 1, A chooses the tallier’s public key and the number of
voters. Line 2 registers voters. A is not permitted to influence
registration while it is in progress. In particular, A is not
permitted to choose credential pairs, because by doing so A
could trivially win the experiment.
Line 4 initializes two sets: Crpt is a set of voters who
have been corrupted, meaning that A has learned their private
credential, and Rvld is a set of ballots that have been revealed
to A. The former set models A coercing voters to reveal their
private credentials. The latter set models A observing ballots
on the bulletin board.
Line 5 challenges A to produce a ballot b with the help
of two oracles. Oracle C is the same oracle as in Exp-IV-Int
(cf. §IV-B1); it leaks the private credentials of corrupted voters
to A. Oracle R reveals ballots. On invocation R(i, β, nC),
where 1 ≤ i ≤ nV , oracle R does the following:
• Computes a ballot b that represents a vote for candidate
β by a voter with private credential sk i, that is, computes
b← Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , β, k).
• Records b as being revealed by updating Rvld to be
Rvld ∪ {b}.
• Outputs b.
In line 6, A wins if (i) the ballot is authentic, meaning that
it is the output of Vote on an authorized credential, and (ii)
that credential belongs to a voter that A did not corrupt, and
(iii) that ballot was not revealed. If A cannot succeed in this
experiment, then only authorized votes are tallied.
4) Election verifiability: With Exp-IV-Int, Exp-UV-Int, and
Exp-EV-Int, we define election verifiability with internal au-
thentication.
Definition 9 (Ver-Int). An election scheme Π satisfies elec-
tion verifiability with internal authentication (Ver-Int) if for
all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function
µ, such that for all security parameters k, it holds that
Succ(Exp-IV-Int(Π,A, k)) + Succ(Exp-UV-Int(Π,A, k)) +
Succ(Exp-EV-Int(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k).
An election scheme satisfies eligibility verifiability if
Succ(Exp-EV-Int(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k), and similarly for indi-
vidual and universal verifiability.
23. Helios-C is claimed to support an alternative definition of authorized,
whereby only the last ballot cast by a voter is authorized. We found that
Helios-C does not support this definition. In particular, an adversary can
observe the ballots cast by a voter and replay one of those ballots. The
replayed ballot will overwrite the last ballot cast by the voter and will be
authorized instead of it.
24. JCJ is claimed to support alternative definitions of authorized—e.g., only
the last ballot cast by a voter is authorized—using a policy [83, §4.1]. We
found that the policy proposed by Juels et al. (namely, “order of postings
to [the bulletin board]”) does not support this definition of authorized. In
particular, an adversary can intercept a voter’s ballot and replay that ballot after
observing the voter’s revote, thus the policy incorrectly defines the first ballot
as authorized. This could be prevented by proving knowledge of previously
constructed ballots (cf. Clarkson et al. [37]).
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C. Example—Toy schemes from digital signatures
A toy election scheme satisfying Ver-Int can be based on a
digital signature scheme.25 Each voter publishes their signed
candidate choice on the bulletin board.
Definition 10. Suppose Γ = (Gen,Sign,Ver) is a digital
signature scheme. Let election scheme Sig(Γ) be defined as
follows:
• Setup(k) outputs (⊥,⊥, p1(k), p2(k)), where p1 and p2
may be any polynomial functions.
• Register(PK T , k) outputs a key pair produced by
Gen(k).
• Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k) outputs a signature produced
by Sign(sk , β).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k) computes a vector X of length
nC , such that X is a tally of all the ballots on BB that
are signed by distinct private keys whose corresponding
public keys appear in L (formally, signatures can be
checked using algorithm Ver), and outputs (X,⊥).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X, P, k) outputs 1 if (X, P ) =
Tally(⊥,⊥,BB , L, nC ,⊥) and 0 otherwise.
Let Sig denote Sig(Γ) for an unspecified digital signature
scheme Γ satisfying strong unforgeablility [7], [24].26 The
verifiability of Sig follows from the security of the underlying
signature scheme:
Proposition 5. Sig satisfies Ver-Int.
Proof sketch. Sig satisfies individual verifiability, because vot-
ers can verify that their signed choices appear on the bulletin
board. Sig satisfies universal verifiability, because signed plain-
text choices are posted on BB . Finally, Sig satisfies eligibility
verifiability, because anyone can check that the signed choices
belong to registered voters.
D. Orthogonality
Exp-IV-Int, Exp-UV-Int, and Exp-EV-Int capture mostly
orthogonal security properties, as shown in Table I. Individ-
ual and universal verifiability are orthogonal, and eligibility
verifiability implies individual verifiability.
Theorem 6. If an election scheme Π satisfies Exp-EV-Int,
then Π also satisfies Exp-IV-Int.
Proof sketch. If Π satisfies Exp-EV-Int, then no one can
construct a ballot that appears to be associated with public
credential pk unless they know private credential sk . That
means that a voter can uniquely identify their ballot, because
no one else knows their private credential. Therefore Π satis-
fies Exp-IV-Int.
The proof of Theorem 6 appears in Appendix G.
In Table I, AlwaysVerify(·) is a function that transforms
an election scheme by compromising Verify to always re-
turn 1. Thus, AlwaysVerify(Π) is guaranteed not to satisfy
Exp-UV-Int. Similarly, IgnoreCreds(·) is a function that ac-
cepts as input an election scheme with external authentication
Line IV UV EV Scheme
1 7 7 7 AlwaysVerify(IgnoreCreds(Choice))
2 7 7 3 —
3 7 3 7 IgnoreCreds(Choice)
4 7 3 3 —
5 3 7 7 AlwaysVerify(IgnoreCreds(Nonce))
6 3 7 3 AlwaysVerify(Sig)
7 3 3 7 Malleable Sig
8 3 3 3 Sig
TABLE I
ELECTION SCHEMES THAT SATISFY EACH COMBINATION OF INDIVIDUAL,
UNIVERSAL AND ELIGIBILITY VERIFIABILITY
and returns as output an election scheme with internal au-
thentication. The resulting scheme, however, simply ignores
credentials altogether: Register returns (⊥,⊥), Vote ignores
sk , and Tally and Verify ignore L. Thus, IgnoreCreds(Π) is
guaranteed not to satisfy Exp-EV-Int. Using those functions,
we briefly explain each line of the table:
1) Recall (from §II-D) that Choice is the election scheme in
which ballots contain only the plaintext candidate choice.
By compromising Verify and ignoring credentials, we
obtain a scheme that satisfies no properties.
2) By Theorem 6, this situation is impossible.
3) Compared to line 1 of Table I, this scheme satisfies
Exp-UV-Int, because Verify is not compromised.
4) By Theorem 6, this situation is impossible.
5) Nonce satisfies Exp-IV-Ext and Exp-UV-Ext. Moreover,
IgnoreCreds(Nonce) satisfies Exp-IV-Int and Exp-UV-Int.
By compromising Verify, we obtain a scheme that satis-
fies only Exp-IV-Int.
6) Sig satisfies all three properties. By compromising Verify,
we obtain a scheme that satisfies only Exp-IV-Int and
Exp-EV-Int.
7) By making Sig’s underlying signature scheme mal-
leable,27 we could obtain a scheme that does not satisfy
Exp-EV-Int, because the adversary could construct a valid
ballot out of a revealed ballot. But the scheme would
continue to satisfy Exp-IV-Int and Exp-UV-Int.
8) Sig satisfies all three properties.
V. CASE STUDY: HELIOS-C
Helios-C [41], [42] is a variant of Helios (cf. §III) for two-
candidate elections in which ballots are digitally signed.28
25. Digital signature schemes are defined in Appendix A.
26. Strong unforgeability is defined in Appendix A.
27. Given a message m and signature σ, a malleable signature scheme
permits computation of a signature σ′ on a related message m′ [27]. The
malleable signature scheme Sig used in line 7 of Table I would need to
enable an adversary to transform a signature on a well-formed candidate β
into a signature on a distinct, well-formed candidate β′.
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Informally, Helios-C works as follows [41, §5]:
• Setup. As in Section III.
• Registration. To register a voter, the registrar generates a
key pair for a signature scheme and sends the private key
to the voter. After all voters are registered, the registrar
publishes electoral roll L.
• Voting. A voter generates a ciphertext and proof as in
Section III, signs the ciphertext and proof with their
private key, and posts their public key, ciphertext, proof,
and signature on the bulletin board.
• Tallying. The tallier aborts if any ballots on the bulletin
board are not signed by distinct private keys whose
corresponding public keys appear in L. The tallier also
aborts if there exists a proof on the bulletin board that
does not hold. The ciphertexts and proofs are processed
as in Section III.
• Verification. If the tallier aborted, then a verifier immedi-
ately accepts. Otherwise, the tallier recomputes the homo-
morphic combination and checks all the zero-knowledge
proofs, as in Section III.
Whilst analyzing Helios-C, we discovered that aborting
violates our definition of universal verifiability. In particular,
an adversary could post an ill-formed ballot on the bulletin
board. (For example, a malicious tallier could secretly tally the
recorded ballots while the election is in progress and, if that
tally is unfavorable to the tallier’s preferred candidate, then the
tallier could post an ill-formed ballot on the bulletin board.)
That ballot will cause tallying to abort. And verifiers will
accept that abort. Yet, our definition of universal verifiability
demands that verifiers only accept outcomes representing all
the choices used to construct the recorded ballots, which abort-
ing violates. Thus, Helios-C does not satisfy our definition
of universal verifiability.29 Nonetheless, a variant of Helios-C
that disregards ill-formed ballots would satisfy our definition
of universal verifiability.
Remark 7. Helioc-C does not satisfy Ver-Int.
Proof sketch. Helios-C aborts on errors in a manner that
violates universal verifiability, as described above.
An informal proof of Remark 7 follows immediately from our
discourse and we do not pursue a formal proof.
Cortier et al. [41] analyzed Helios-C using a different
definition of universal verifiability. That definition can be
satisfied by schemes in which tallying aborts in a manner that
anyone will accept. In particular, the experiment used by that
definition cannot be won by an adversary that causes an abort.
Thus, verifiers accept outcomes that do not include the choices
used to construct voters’ ballots. By comparison, our definition
demands that verifiers reject such outcomes.
VI. CASE STUDY: JCJ
JCJ (named for its designers, Juels, Catalano, and Jakobs-
son) [81]–[83] is a coercion-resistant election scheme, mean-
ing voters cannot prove whether or how they voted, even if
they can interact with the adversary while voting. Coercion
resistance protects elections from improper influence by ad-
versaries.
To achieve verifiability and coercion resistance, JCJ uses
verifiable mixnets, which anonymize a set of messages.30
During tallying, all encrypted choices are anonymized by a
mixnet, then all choices are decrypted. The tally is computed
from the decrypted choices. Informally, JCJ works as follows:
• Setup. The tallier generates a key pair (PK T ,SK T ) for
an encryption scheme and publishes the public key.
• Registration. To register a voter, the registrar generates
a nonce, which is sent to the voter and serves as the
private credential. The public credential is computed as an
encryption of the private credential with PK T . After all
voters are registered, the registrar publishes the electoral
roll.
• Voting. A voter encrypts her candidate choice with PK T .
She also encrypts her private credential with PK T . She
proves in zero-knowledge that she simultaneously knows
both plaintexts, and that her choice is well-formed. The
voter posts her ballot (i.e., both ciphertexts and the proof)
on the bulletin board.
• Tallying. The tallier discards any ballots from the bulletin
board for which the zero-knowledge proofs do not verify.
All unauthorized ballots are then discarded through a
combination of protocols that includes verifiable mixnets
and plaintext equivalence tests (PETs) [78]. (PETs enable
proof that two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext
without revealing that plaintext.) The tallier decrypts and
publishes the remaining ballots, along with a proof that
decryption was performed correctly.
• Verification. A verifier checks all the proofs included in
ballots, and all the proofs published during tallying.
Appendix H gives a formal description of JCJ. That formal-
ization satisfies individual and universal verifiability, assuming
that the cryptographic primitives satisfy certain properties that
we identify. But the formalization fails to satisfy eligibility
verifiability, because knowledge of the tallier’s private key
SK T suffices to construct ballots that appear authentic: with
SK T , any public credential can be decrypted to discover the
corresponding private credential. Note that Exp-EV-Int permits
an adversary A to choose the tallier’s key pair, so A does
know SK T hence can construct a ballot that suffices to win
Exp-EV-Int.
We can nonetheless prove that JCJ satisfies a variant of
eligibility verifiability. Consider the following experiment,
28. Helios-C has been implemented (https://github.com/glondu/helios-server/
tree/heliosc, released c. 2013, accessed 25 Nov 2015), but development
has ceased in favour of the Belenios variant (https://github.com/glondu/
belenios/releases/tag/1.0, released 22 Apr 2016, accessed 25 Apr 2016). We
analyse Helios-C because a cryptographic definition has been presented in
the literature, whereas Belenios has not appeared in the literature. (Results
for one system do not imply results for the other, because the two systems
are rather different. And similarly for a further variant [40] of Helios-C.)
29. Helios 2.0, Helios’12 and Helios’16 do not abort, so they are not similarly
effected.
30. Chaum [28] introduced mixnets. Adida [1] surveys verifiable mixnets.
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which does not permit the adversary to choose the tallier’s
key pair:
Exp-EV-Int-Weak(Π,A, k) =
(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);1
nV ← A(PK T , k);2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k);3
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };4
Crpt ← ∅; Rvld ← ∅;5
(nC , β, i, b)← AC,R(L);6
if ∃r : b = Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , β, k; r) ∧ b 6= ⊥ ∧ b 6∈7
Rvld ∧ ski 6∈ Crpt then
return 18
else9
return 010
Line 1 of Exp-EV-Int has been refactored into lines 1 and 2
of Exp-EV-Int-Weak. In line 1 of Exp-EV-Int-Weak, keys are
generated by the experiment. In line 2, A is given the public
key but not the private key.
Using Exp-EV-Int-Weak, we define a weaker variant of
Ver-Int and prove that JCJ satisfies it:
Definition 11 (Ver-Int-Weak). An election scheme Π sat-
isfies weak election verifiability with internal authentication
(Ver-Int-Weak) if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a
negligible function µ, such that for all security parameters k,
we have Succ(Exp-IV-Int(Π,A, k))+Succ(Exp-UV-Int(Π,A,
k)) + Succ(Exp-EV-Int-Weak(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k).
Theorem 8. JCJ satisfies Ver-Int-Weak.
Proof sketch. JCJ satisfies individual verifiability, because
the probabilistic encryption scheme ensures that ballots are
unique, with overwhelming probability. JCJ satisfies universal
verifiability, because the proofs produced throughout tallying
can be publicly verified. And JCJ satisfies eligibility verifiabil-
ity, because A cannot construct new ballots without knowing
a voter’s private credential or the tallier’s private key.
A formal proof of Theorem 8 appears in Appendix I. The
proof assumes the random oracle model.
The Civitas [37] scheme refines the JCJ scheme. Some
refinements relevant to election verifiability are an implemen-
tation of a distributed registration protocol, and a mixnet based
on randomized partial checking (RPC) [79]. We leave a proof
that Civitas satisfies Ver-Int-Weak as future work. In that
proof, it would be necessary to assume the RPC construction
satisfies the definition of mixnets given in Appendix A.
Work by Khazaei and Wikstro¨m [85] suggests that actually
proving satisfaction is unlikely to be possible. Alternatively,
the mixnet could be replaced by one based on zero-knowledge
proofs [61], [99].
VII. NEW CLASSES OF ATTACK
Our definitions of election verifiability improve upon exist-
ing definitions by detecting two previously unidentified classes
of attack:
• Collusion attacks. An election scheme’s tallying and
verification algorithms might be designed such that they
collude to accept incorrect tallies.
• Biasing attacks. An election scheme’s verification al-
gorithm might be designed such that it rejects some
legitimate tallies.
Although a well-designed election scheme would hopefully
not exhibit these vulnerabilities, it is the job of verifiability
definitions to detect malicious schemes, regardless of whether
vulnerabilities are due to malice or errors. So definitions of
election verifiability should preclude collusion and biasing
attacks.
A. Collusion Attacks
Here are two examples of potential collusion attacks:
• Vote stuffing. Tally behaves normally, but adds κ votes
for candidate β. Verify subtracts κ votes from β, then
proceeds with verification as normal. Elections thus verify
as normal, except that candidate β receives extra votes.
• Backdoor tally replacement. Tally and Verify behave
normally, unless a backdoor value is posted on the
bulletin board BB . For example, if (SK T ,X∗) appears
on BB , then Tally and Verify both ignore the correct
tally and instead replace it with tally X∗. Value SK T is
the backdoor here; it cannot appear on BB (except with
negligible probability) unless the tallier is malicious.
Vote stuffing is detected by our definitions of Correctness
(§II-A and §IV-A), because these definitions require that the
tally produced by Tally corresponds to the choices encapsu-
lated in ballots on the bulletin board. Note that vote stuffing
is not a failure of eligibility verifiability, because the stuffed
votes do not correspond to any ballots on the bulletin board.
Backdoor tally replacement is detected by our definitions
of universal verifiability (§II-B2 and §IV-B2), because those
definitions require Verify to accept only those tallies that
correspond to a correct tally of the bulletin board.
We show, next, that the definition of election verifiability
by Juels et al. [83] fails to detect vote stuffing and backdoor
tally replacement, and that the definition by Cortier et al. [41]
fails to detect backdoor tally replacement.
Juels et al. [83] formalize definitions that we name JCJ-
correctness and JCJ-verifiability. JCJ-correctness is intuitively
meant to capture that “A cannot pre-empt, alter, or cancel the
votes of honest voters [and] that A cannot cause voters to cast
ballots resulting in double voting” [83, p. 45]; it is formalized
in terms of whether the adversary can post ballots on the
bulletin board that cause the tally to be computed incorrectly.
JCJ-verifiability is intuitively “the ability for any player to
check whether the tally. . . has been correctly computed” [83,
p. 46]; it is formalized in terms of whether Verify will accept
a tally that differs from the output of Tally. We restate the
formal definitions in Appendix J.
To show that the JCJ definitions fail to detect collu-
sion attacks, we first formalize the vote stuffing attack. An
election scheme Π = (. . . ,Tally,Verify) can be modified
11
to derive a vote-stuffing election scheme Stuff(Π, β, κ) =
(. . . ,TallyS ,VerifyS), which adds κ votes to β, as follows:
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• TallyS(. . .) computes (X, P ) ← Tally(. . .) and outputs
(Add(X, β, κ), P ).32
• VerifyS(. . . ,X, P, . . .) computes v ← Verify(. . . , Add(
X, β,−κ), P, . . .) and outputs v.
Proposition 9. Given an election scheme Π satisfying JCJ-
correctness and JCJ-verifiability, and integers β and κ, it
holds that Stuff(Π, β, κ) satisfies JCJ-correctness and JCJ-
verifiability.
A formal proof appears in Appendix K.
Second, we formalize the backdoor tally replacement attack.
An election scheme Π = (. . . ,Tally,Verify) can be modified
to derive an election scheme Backdoor(Π) = (. . . ,TallyB ,
VerifyB), as follows:
• TallyB(. . . ,SK T ,BB , . . .) checks whether there exists a
unique X∗ such that (SK T ,X∗) ∈ BB . If so, TallyB
outputs (X∗,⊥). Otherwise, TallyB computes (X, P )←
Tally(. . . ,SK T ,BB , . . .) and outputs (X, P ).
• VerifyB(PK T , . . . ,BB , . . . ,X, P, . . .) checks whether
there exists a unique X∗ such that (SK T ,X∗) ∈ BB .33
If so, VerifyB outputs 1. Otherwise, VerifyB computes
v ← Verify(PK T , . . . ,BB , . . . ,X, P, . . .) and outputs v.
Proposition 10. Given an election scheme Π satisfying JCJ-
correctness and JCJ-verifiability that does not leak the tal-
lier’s private key, it holds that Backdoor(Π) satisfies JCJ-
correctness and JCJ-verifiability.
A formal proof appears in Appendix K, where we also
formally define key leakage.
Cortier et al. [41] propose definitions similar to JCJ-
verifiability and insist that election schemes must satisfy their
notions of correctness and partial tallying. Vote stuffing is
detected by their correctness property, but backdoor tally
replacement is not. The ideas remain the same, so we omit
formalized results. We have reported these findings to the
original authors.34,35
B. Biasing attacks
Here are three formalizations of biasing attacks, derived
from an election scheme Π = (. . . ,Verify).
• Reject All. Let Reject(Π) be (. . . ,VerifyR), where
VerifyR always outputs 0. VerifyR therefore always re-
jects, hence no election can ever be considered valid.
• Selective Reject. Let ε be a distinguished
value that would not be posted on the bulletin
board by honest voters. Let Selective(Π, ε) be
(. . . ,VerifyR), where VerifyR(. . . ,BB , . . .) computes
v ← Verify(. . . ,BB , . . .) and outputs 1 if both v = 1
and ε 6∈ BB . Otherwise, VerifyR outputs 0. VerifyR
therefore rejects if ε appears on the bulletin board, hence
some elections can be invalidated.
• Biased Reject. Suppose Z is a set of tallies. Let
Bias(Π, Z) be (. . . ,VerifyR), where VerifyR(. . . ,X, . . .)
computes v ← Verify(. . . ,X, . . .) and outputs 1 if both
v = 1 and X ∈ Z. Otherwise, VerifyR outputs 0. VerifyR
therefore only accepts a subset of the tallies accepted by
Verify, hence biases tallies toward Z.
These formalizations do not satisfy our definition of Complete-
ness (§II-A and §IV-A), hence, our definitions of verifiability
detect these biasing attacks.
The definition of verifiability by Juels et al. [83] fails to
detect all three of the above attacks, because that definition
has no notion of Completeness. For example, it is vulnerable
to Biased Reject attacks:
Proposition 11. Given an election scheme Π satisfying JCJ-
correctness and JCJ-verifiability, and given a multiset Z,
it holds that Bias(Π, Z) satisfies JCJ-correctness and JCJ-
verifiability.
A formal proof appears in Appendix K.
The definition of verifiability by Kiayias et al. [87] fails
to detect Selective Reject attacks, because (like JCJ) the
definition has no notion of Completeness. Their notion of
Correctness does rule out Reject All and Biased Reject attacks.
Similarly, the definition of verifiability by Cortier et al. [41]
detects Biased Reject and Reject All attacks, but fails to detect
Selective Reject attacks, because that definition’s notion of
Completeness does not quantify over all bulletin boards.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Kiayias [86] presents an overview of security properties
for election schemes. Many election schemes in the literature
state properties called correctness, accuracy, or (universal)
verifiability without formally defining those terms.
In the computational model, Juels et al. [81]–[83] and
Cortier et al. [41] give game-based definitions of verifiability.
Those definitions fail to detect biasing and collusion attacks
(cf. §VII). Definitions of universal verifiability (which is just
one aspect of election verifiability) in the computational model
seem to originate with Benaloh and Tuinstra [17], who define
a correctness property that says every participant is convinced
that the tally is accurate with respect to the votes cast, and
with Cohen and Fischer [38], who define verifiability to mean
that there exists a check function that returns good iff the
announced tally of the election corresponds to the cast votes.
Kiayias et al. [87] define a property they name E2E verifia-
bility (E2E abbreviates “end-to-end”). This property combines
our intuitive notions of individual and universal verifiability
31. We omit many of the parameters of Tally and Verify here for simplicity;
see Appendix K for details.
32. Let Add(X, β, κ) = (X[1], . . . ,X[β − 1],X[β] + κ,X[β +
1], . . . ,X[|X|]). And let |X| denote the length of vector X.
33. VerifyB also needs to check that SKT is the private key corresponding
to PKT . We omit formalizing this detail, but note that it is straightforward
for real-world encryption schemes such as El Gamal and RSA.
34. Ve´ronique Cortier and David Galindo, personal communication, Nancy,
France, 13 June 2013.
35. David Galindo and Ve´ronique Cortier, email communication, 19 June
2013 & Summer/Autumn 2014.
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into a single definition. Their definition fails to detect Selective
Reject attacks (cf. §VII). Their definitions, like ours, do
not address voter intent—that is, verification by humans that
ballots correctly encode candidate choices—as we discuss in
Section IX.
Also in the computational model, Groth [68], and Moran
and Naor [98], state definitions of verifiability in terms of
universal composability [26]. These definitions involve defin-
ing an ideal functionality; part of that is similar to our
correct-tally function. Groth’s definition does not guaran-
tee universal verifiability [68, p. 2], but Moran and Naor’s
does [98, p. 386].
In the symbolic model, Smyth et al. [120] define the first
definition of election verifiability. This definition is amenable
to automated reasoning, but is stronger than necessary and
cannot be satisfied by many election schemes, including Helios
and Civitas. Kremer et al. [89] overcome this limitation
with a weaker definition that sacrifices amenability to auto-
mated reasoning, and Smyth [111, §3] extends this definition.
Additionally, the scope of automated reasoning, using the
definition by Smyth et al., is limited by analysis tools (e.g.,
ProVerif [23]), because the function symbols and equational
theory used to model cryptographic primitives might not be
suitable for automated analysis (cf. [8], [54], [103], [114]).
Cortier et al. [39] overcome this limitation with an alternative
definition based on refinement type systems.
Also in the symbolic model, Kremer and Ryan [88] and
Backes et al. [9] formalize definitions of eligibility. These
definitions are not intended to provide assurances if the
election authorities are dishonest. For example, the definition
of Kremer and Ryan does not detect whether corrupt election
authorities insert votes [88, §5.2]. Likewise, the definition of
Backes et al. assumes that election authorities are honest [9,
§3].
Our definition of election verifiability has been adapted to
auction schemes by Quaglia & Smyth [106]. And the definition
of election verifiability by Kremer et al. [89] has been adapted
to auction [56] and examination [55], [57] schemes. Moreover,
McCarthy et al. [97] have shown that auction schemes can
be constructed from Helios and JCJ. Thus, our results are
applicable beyond voting.
Our definition of election verifiability follows Smyth et
al. [89], [111], [120] by deconstructing it into individual,
universal, and eligibility verifiability. Other deconstructions of
election verifiability are possible. For example, Adida and Neff
[6, §2] identify four aspects of verifiability:
• Cast as intended: the ballot is cast at the polling station
as the voter intended.
• Recorded as cast: cast ballots are preserved with integrity
through the ballot collection process.
• Counted as recorded: recorded ballots are counted cor-
rectly.
• Eligible voter verification: only eligible voters can cast a
ballot in the first place.
Those definitions are not mathematical, so we cannot attempt
a precise comparison. Nonetheless, eligibility verifiability and
eligible voter verification seem to be addressing similar con-
cerns. Likewise, individual and universal verifiability together
seem to be addressing concerns similar to that of recorded
as cast and counted as recorded together. Recorded as cast, in
our work, reduces to the bulletin board preserving ballots with
integrity—a property that we have assumed, because crypto-
graphic election schemes assume it, too. Ways to construct
secure bulletin boards have been proposed, e.g., [50], [72],
[105], [108]. We postpone a discussion of cast as intended to
Section IX.
Privacy properties [53], [83], [93], [94], [115], [117]—such
as ballot secrecy, receipt freeness, and coercion resistance—
complement verifiability. Chevallier-Mames et al. [34], [35]
and Hosp and Vora [75], [76] show an incompatibility result:
election schemes cannot unconditionally satisfy privacy and
universal verifiability. But weaker versions of these properties
can hold simultaneously, as can be witnessed from Theorems 4
and 8 coupled with existing privacy results such as the
ballot secrecy proofs for Helios’12 [21, Theorem 3], [20,
Theorem 6.12], and the coercion resistance proof for JCJ [83,
§5].
Comparison with global verifiability: Ku¨sters et al. [92],
[93], [95] present a definition of global verifiability that can
be used with any kind of protocol, not just electronic voting
protocols. To analyze the verifiability of a protocol, users of
this definition must themselves formalize goals, which are
properties required to hold in every run of the protocol. For
example, a goal γ` is presented in a case study [93, §5.2] of
global verifiability applied to voting:
γ` contains all runs for which there exist choices
of the dishonest voters (where a choice is either to
abstain or to vote for one of the candidates) such that
the result obtained together with the choices made by
the honest voters in this run differs only by ` votes
from the published result (i.e. the result that can be
computed from the simple ballots on the bulletin
board).
Another goal γ is presented in a case study [95, §6.2] of
Helios:
γ is satisfied in a run if the published result exactly
reflects the actual votes of the honest voters in this
run and votes of dishonest voters are distributed in
some way on the candidates, possibly in a different
way than how the dishonest voters actually voted.
These informal statements of goals are appealing, but they
do not constitute rigorous mathematical definitions. As Kiayias
et al. write, “[global verifiability] has the disadvantage that the
set γ remains undetermined and thus the level of verifiability
that is offered by the definition hinges on the proper definition
of γ which may not be simple” [87, p. 476]. In our own
work, we found that formal definitions were quite tricky to get
right—for example, which ballots should be counted, how to
count them, and how to determine whether that count differed
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from the published tally. So we shared36 and discussed37 our
results with Ku¨sters. In response, Ku¨sters et al. updated an
online technical report to propose a formalization of goals [90,
§5.2]; we look forward to analyzing that formalization when
it is formally published.
In an analysis of Helios, Ku¨sters et al. [95] use goal γ
to conclude that Helios 2.0 satisfies global verifiability. Yet
Bernhard et al. [21] demonstrate a vulnerability against the
verifiability of Helios 2.0, and in Appendix D we show that
Helios 2.0 does not satisfy Ver-Ext. This seeming discrepancy
arises because the analysis in [95] does not formalize all the
cryptographic primitives used by Helios, hence the vulnerabil-
ity goes unnoticed. So another contribution of our own work
is to correctly distinguish between unverifiable and verifiable
variants of Helios by rigorously analyzing the cryptography
used in Helios.
It is natural to ask whether election verifiability can be
expressed in terms of global verifiability. We believe it can be.
For instance, individual, universal and eligibility verifiability
could be expressed, in the informal style of the goals quoted
above, as the following goals:
• γIV is satisfied in a run if voters can uniquely identify
their ballots on the bulletin board in this run.
• γUV is satisfied in a run if the correct tally of votes cast
by authorized voters in this run is the same as the tally
produced by algorithm Tally.
• γEV is satisfied in a run if every ballot tallied in this
run was created by a voter in possession of a private
credential.
More concretely, Cortier et al. [43] formalize a goal that is
intended to express our definition of election verifiability with
external authentication.38 They also formalize goals intended
to express definitions of election verifiability by Cohen and
Fischer [14], [38], Kiayias et al. [87], and Cortier et al. [41].
Ku¨sters et al. [93] argue that deconstructing verifiability
into individual and universal verifiability is insufficient to
detect certain attacks involving ill-formed ballots. But those
attacks leave open the possibility that there do exist notions of
individual and universal verifiability that would be sufficient.
Indeed, our own definition of universal verifiability rules out
attacks based on ill-formed ballots, because correct-tally
ensures that tallied ballots are well-formed. And Cortier et
al. claim that their definitions of individual and universal
verifiability also rule out such attacks [39, §1].
One concern that might be raised is whether there still
lurk any “gaps” in our decomposition into individual and
universal (and eligibility) verifiability. Indeed, there might be.
But the definition of global verifiability does not rule out the
possibility of gaps, either: any gap in the formal statement of a
goal will lead to a vulnerability. That is, if the analyst forgets
to include some necessary facet of verifiability when stating
the formal goal, then global verifiability will not detect any
attacks against that facet. Indeed, Cortier et al. [43, §1] state
that some of the goals they formalize have “severe limitations
and weaknesses.” Global verifiability does not guarantee a lack
of gaps.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When we began this work, we were studying the Juels et
al. [83] definition of election verifiability. We discovered that
the definition fails to detect biasing and collusion attacks.
While attempting to improve the Juels et al. definition to
rule out those attacks, we discovered that factoring it into
individual, universal, and eligibility verifiability led to an
elegant decomposition of (mostly) orthogonal properties. We
later sought to apply our new definitions to existing electronic
voting systems, and Helios [5] and JCJ [83] were natural
choices. But they treat authentication differently—Helios out-
sources authentication, whereas JCJ does not—so we were
led to separate our definitions into variants for external and
internal authentication. We were at first surprised to discover
that JCJ does not satisfy the strong definition of eligibility
verifiability. But upon reflection, it became apparent that an
adversary who knows the tallier’s private key can easily forge
ballots that appear to be from eligible voters. Helios-C [41],
however, avoids this problem by employing digital signatures.
Our definitions of verifiability have not addressed the issue
of voter intent—that is, verification by a human that the ballot
submitted by a voter corresponds to the candidate choice the
voter intended to make. Adida and Neff call this property
“cast as intended” [6]. Many election schemes (e.g., [60],
[74], [83], [87]) do not satisfy cast as intended, because the
schemes implicitly or explicitly assume that voters can them-
selves verify the cryptographic operations required to construct
ballots. Nevertheless, schemes by Chaum [29], Neff [100],
and Benaloh [15], [16] introduce cryptographic mechanisms to
verify voter intent. It would be natural to explore strengthening
our definitions to address voter intent.
The goal of this research is to enable verifiability of the
voting systems we use in real-life, rather than merely trusting
them. Research on verifiability can generalize beyond voting
to other systems that must guarantee strong forms of integrity.
Verifiable voting systems thus have the potential to contribute
to the science of security, to democracy, and to broader society.
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APPENDIX A
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
A. Basic definitions
Definition 12 (Negligible function [64]). A function µ : N→
R is negligible if for every positive polynomial function p(·),
there exists an N , such that for all n > N ,
µ(n) <
1
p(n)
.
An event E(k), where k is a security parameter, occurs with
negligible probability if Pr[E(k)] ≤ µ(k) for some negligible
function µ. The event occurs with overwhelming probability if
the complement of the event occurs with negligible probability.
Definition 13 (Asymmetric encryption scheme [84]). An
asymmetric encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms
(Gen,Enc,Dec) such that:
• Gen, denoted (pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k), takes a security
parameter k as input and outputs a key pair (pk , sk)
and message space m.
• Enc, denoted c← Enc(pk ,m), takes a public key pk and
message m ∈ m as input, and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec, denoted m ← Dec(sk , c), takes a private key sk ,
and ciphertext c as input, and outputs a message m or
error symbol ⊥. We assume Dec is deterministic.
Moreover, the scheme must be correct: there exists a neg-
ligible function µ, such that for all security parameters k
and messages m, we have Pr[(pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k); c ←
Enc(pk ,m) : m ∈ m⇒ Dec(sk , c) = m] > 1− µ(k).
Our definition of asymmetric encryption schemes differs from
Katz and Lindell’s definition [84, Definition 10.1] in that we
formally state the plaintext space.
Definition 14 (Homomorphic encryption). An asymmetric
encryption scheme Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is homomorphic, with
respect to ternary operators , ⊕, and ⊗,40 if there exists a
negligible function µ, such that for all security parameters
k, we have the following.41 First, for all messages m1 and
m2 we have Pr[(pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k); c1 ← Enc(pk ,m1);
c2 ← Enc(pk ,m2) : m1,m2 ∈ m ⇒ Dec(sk , c1 ⊗pk c2)
= Dec(sk , c1) pk Dec(sk , c2)] > 1 − µ(k). Secondly, for
all messages m1 and m2, and coins r1 and r2, we have
Pr[(pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k) : m1,m2 ∈ m ⇒ Enc(pk ,m1; r1)
⊗pk Enc(pk ,m2; r2) = Enc(pk ,m1 pk m2; r1 ⊕pk r2)]
> 1− µ(k).
We say Γ is additively homomorphic, respectively multi-
plicatively homomorphic, if for all security parameters k,
key pairs pk , sk , and message spaces m, such that there
exists coins r and (pk , sk ,m) = Setup(k), we have pk is
the addition operator, respectively multiplication operator, in
group (m,pk ).
Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack
(IND-CPA) [10], [12], [13], [65], [66] is a standard
definition of security for encryption schemes. Intuitively, if
an encryption scheme satisfies IND-CPA, then an adversary
without access to a decryption oracle is unable to distinguish
ciphertexts. A variant (IND-j-CPA) allows the adversary j
adaptive queries to a decryption oracle, where each query is
a parallel decryption query—i.e., it requests the decryption
of a vector of ciphertexts. Hence, IND-0-CPA is equivalent
to IND-CPA.
Definition 15 (IND-j-CPA [22]). An asymmetric encryption
scheme Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) satisfies IND-j-CPA if for all
stateful PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible func-
tion µ, such that for all security parameters k, we have
Succ(Exp-CPA(j,Γ,A, k)) ≤ 12 + µ(k), where j is a non-
negative integer and the experiment Exp-CPA is defined as
follows:42
Exp-CPA(j,Γ,A, k) =
(pk , sk ,m)← Gen(k);1
(m0,m1)← A(pk ,m);2
b←R {0, 1};3
c← Enc(pk ,mb);4
b′ ← AO(c);5
if b = b′ ∧m0,m1 ∈ m ∧ |m0| = |m1| then6
return 17
else8
return 09
where A has access to a decryption oracle O, which is defined
as follows43:
O(c) =
39. The dedication references Linda Ellis (1996) The Dash.
40. Henceforth, we implicitly bind ternary operators—i.e., we write Γ is a
homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme as opposed to the more verbose
Γ is a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme, with respect to ternary
operators , ⊕, and ⊗.
41. We write X ◦pk Y for the application of ternary operator ◦ to inputs X ,
Y , and pk . We occasionally abbreviate X ◦pk Y as X ◦Y , when pk is clear
from the context.
42. Let x←R S denote assignment to x of an element chosen uniformly at
random from set S.
43. The oracle in experiment Exp-CPA may access parameter j. Henceforth,
we continue to allow oracles to access experiment parameters without explic-
itly mentioning them.
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if j > 0 ∧∧1≤i≤|c| c 6= c[i] then1
j ← j − 1;2
return (Dec(sk , c[1]), . . . ,Dec(sk , c[|c|]))3
else4
return ⊥5
Definition 16 (Signature scheme [84]). A signature scheme is
a tuple (Gen,Sign,Ver) of PPT algorithms such that:
• Gen, denoted (pk , sk) ← Gen(k), takes a security
parameter k as input and outputs a key pair (pk , sk).
• Sign, denoted σ ← Sign(sk ,m), takes a private key sk
and message m as input, and outputs a signature σ.
• Verify, denoted v ← Ver(pk ,m, σ), takes a public key
pk , message m, and signature σ as input, and outputs a
bit v, which is 1 if the signature successfully verifies and
0 otherwise. We assume Ver is deterministic.
Moreover, the scheme must be correct: there exists a neg-
ligible function µ, such that for all security parameters k
and messages m, we have Pr[(pk , sk) ← Gen(k);σ ←
Sign(sk ,m); Ver(pk ,m, σ) = 1] > 1− µ(k).
Definition 17 (EU-CMA [84]). A signature scheme Γ =
(Gen,Sign,Ver) satisfies existential unforgeablility under
adaptive chosen-message attack (EU-CMA) if for all PPT
adversaries A, there exists a negligible function µ, such that
for all security parameters k, we have Succ(Exp-Sign(Γ,
A, k)) ≤ µ(k), where experiment Exp-Sign is defined as
follows:
Exp-Sign(Γ,A, k) =
(pk , sk)← Gen(k);1
Msg ← ∅;2
(m,σ)← AO(pk , k);3
if Ver(pk ,m, σ) = 1 ∧m 6∈ Msg then4
return 15
else6
return 07
The experiment defines an oracle O. On invocation O(m),
oracle O computes a signature σ ← Sign(sk ,m), records that
the adversary requested a signature on m by updating Msg
to be Msg ∪ {m}, and outputs σ.
Definition 18. A signature scheme Γ = (Gen,Sign,Ver) sat-
isfies strong unforgeability if for all PPT adversaries A, there
exists a negligible function µ, such that for all security pa-
rameters k, we have Succ(Exp-StrongSign(Γ,A, k)) ≤ µ(k),
where experiment Exp-StrongSign is defined as follows:
Exp-StrongSign(Γ,A, k) =
(pk , sk)← Gen(k);1
Msg ← ∅;2
(m,σ)← AO(pk , k);3
if Ver(pk ,m, σ) = 1 ∧ (m,σ) 6∈ Msg then4
return 15
else6
return 07
The experiment defines an oracle O. On invocation O(m),
oracle O computes a signature σ ← Sign(sk ,m), records the
request and response (m,σ) by updating Msg to be Msg ∪
{(m,σ)}, and outputs σ.
B. Proof systems
A proof system (originally known as an interactive proof
system [67]) is a two-party protocol between a prover and a
verifier. The prover convinces the verifier that a string x is in
a language L. Here, we assume that there is a witness relation
R, such that s ∈ L iff there exists a witness w, such that
(s, w) ∈ R. For any (s, w) ∈ R, it must also hold that the
length of w is at most polynomial in the length of s. Proof
systems ensure that a prover can convince a verifier of any
valid claim (completeness), and that a verifier cannot be fooled
into accepting a false claim (soundness).
A sigma protocol [51], [71] is a proof system with a
particular three-move structure: commit, challenge, respond.
Definition 19 (Sigma protocol). A sigma protocol for a
relation R is a tuple (Comm,Chal,Resp,Verify) of PPT
algorithms such that:
• Comm, denoted (comm, t) ← Comm(s, w, k), is exe-
cuted by a prover. Comm takes a statement s, witness
w and security parameter k as input, and outputs a
commitment comm and some state information t.
• Chal, denoted chal ← Chal(s, comm, k), is executed by
a verifier. Chal takes a statement s, a commitment comm
and a security parameter k as input, and outputs a string
chal.
• Resp, denoted resp ← Resp(chal, t, k), is executed by a
prover. Resp takes a challenge chal, state information t
and security parameter k as input, and outputs a response
resp.
• Verify, denoted v ← Verify(s, (comm, chal, resp), k) is
executed by a verifier. Verify takes a statement s, a
transcript (comm, chal, resp) and a security parameter k
as input, and outputs a bit v, which is 1 if the transcript
successfully verifies and 0 otherwise. We assume Verify
is deterministic.
Moreover, the sigma protocol must be complete: there
exists a negligible function µ, such that for all state-
ments and witnesses (s, w) ∈ R and security parame-
ters k, we have Pr[(comm, t) ← Comm(s, w, k); chal ←
Chal(s, comm, k); resp ← Resp(chal, t, k) : Verify(s, (comm,
chal, resp), k) = 1] > 1− µ(k).
Some sigma protocols ensure special soundness and special
honest-verifier zero-knowledge. We will make use of a result
by Bernhard et al. that requires these properties, but we will
not need the details of those definitions in our proofs, so we
omit them here; see Bernhard et al. [21] for a formalization.
Definition 20. Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a homomorphic asym-
metric encryption scheme and Σ be a sigma protocol for a
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binary relation R.44
• Σ proves correct key construction if
((k, pk ,m), (sk , r)) ∈ R⇔ (pk , sk ,m) = Gen(k; r)
Further, suppose that (pk , sk ,m) is the output of Gen(k; r),
for some security parameter k and coins r.
• Σ proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace if
((pk , c,m′), (m, r)) ∈ R
⇔ c = Enc(pk ,m; r) ∧m ∈ m′ ∧m′ ⊆ m.
• Σ proves conjunctive plaintext knowledge if
((pk , c1, . . . , ck), (m1, r1, . . . ,mk, rk)) ∈ R
⇔
∧
1≤i≤k
ci = Enc(pk ,mi; ri) ∧ mi ∈ m.
• Σ proves correct reencryption if
((pk , c, c), (i, r)) ∈ R
⇔ c = c[i]⊗ Enc(pk , e; r) ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ |c|
where c is a vector of ciphertexts encrypted under pk , and
where e is an identity element of the encryption scheme’s
message space with respect to .
• Σ is a plaintext equivalence test (PET) if
((pk , c, c′, i), sk) ∈ R
⇔ ((i = 0 ∧ Dec(sk , c) 6= Dec(sk , c′))
∨ (i = 1 ∧ Dec(sk , c) = Dec(sk , c′)))
∧ Dec(sk , c) 6= ⊥ ∧ Dec(sk , c′) 6= ⊥.
• Σ is a mixnet if
((pk , c, c′), (r, χ)) ∈ R
⇔
∧
1≤i≤|c|
c′[χ(i)] = c[i]⊗ Enc(pk , e; r[i])
∧ |c| = |c′| = |r|
where c and c′ are both vectors of ciphertexts encrypted
under pk , and χ is a permutation on {1, . . . , |c|}, and e
is an identity element of the encryption scheme’s message
space with respect to .
• Σ proves correct decryption if
((pk , c,m), sk) ∈ R⇔ m = Dec(sk , c).
C. Non-interactive proof systems
A proof system is non-interactive if a single message is sent
from the prover to the verifier.
Definition 21 (Non-interactive proof system). A non-interac-
tive proof system for a relation R is a tuple of PPT algorithms
(Prove,Verify) such that:
• Prove, denoted σ ← Prove(s, w, k), is executed by a
prover to prove (s, w) ∈ R.
• Verify, denoted v ← Verify(s, σ, k), is executed by
anyone to check the validity of a proof. We assume Verify
is deterministic.
Moreover, the system must be complete: there exists a negli-
gible function µ, such that for all statement and witnesses
(s, w) ∈ R and security parameters k, we have Pr[σ ←
Prove(s, w, k) : Verify(s, σ, k) = 1] > 1− µ(k).
We can derive non-interactive proof systems from sigma
protocols using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [59], which
replaces the verifier’s challenge with a hash of the prover’s
commitment, concatenated with the prover’s statement.
Definition 22 (Fiat-Shamir transformation [59]). Given a
sigma protocol Σ = (Comm,Chal,Resp,VerifyΣ) for relation
R and a hash function H, the Fiat-Shamir transformation,
denoted FS(Σ,H), is the tuple (Prove,Verify) of algorithms,
defined as follows:
Prove(s, w, k) =
(comm, t)← Comm(s, w, k);1
chal← H(comm, s);2
resp← Resp(chal, t, k);3
return (comm, resp)4
Verify(s, (comm, resp), k) =
chal← H(comm, s);1
return VerifyΣ(s, (comm, chal, resp), k)2
It is straightforward to check that FS produces non-interactive
proof systems. In particular, given sigma protocol Σ for
relation R, and a hash function H, we have FS(Σ,H) is a
non-interactive proof system for relation R.
Some applications of the Fiat-Shamir transformation pro-
duce non-interactive proof systems satisfying zero-knowledge:
anything a verifier can derive about a witness can be derived
without interaction with a prover—that is, the prover can be
simulated by a PPT algorithm called a simulator. We will not
need the details of zero-knowledge in our proofs, so we omit
them here; see Bernhard et al. [21] or Quaglia & Smyth [106]
for formalizations.
In addition, some applications of the Fiat-Shamir transfor-
mation produce non-interactive proof systems satisfying simu-
lation sound extractability: an extractor can recover witnesses
from proofs by rewinding the prover, as discussed below. (We
use extractors in our proofs of theorems, to obtain witnesses
from proofs.) We define simulation sound extractability in
the random oracle model [11]. A random oracle can be
programmed or patched. We will not need the details of how
patching works in our proofs, so we omit them here; see
Bernhard et al. [21] for a formalization.
Definition 23 (Simulation sound extractability [21], [69]).
Suppose that Σ is a sigma protocol for relation R, that H is
a random oracle, and that (Prove,Verify) is a non-interactive
proof system, such that FS(Σ,H) = (Prove,Verify). Further
suppose S is a simulator for (Prove,Verify) and H can be
44. Given a binary relation R, we write ((s1, . . . , sl), (w1, . . . , wk)) ∈
R ⇔ P (s1, . . . , sl, w1, . . . , wk) for (s, w) ∈ R ⇔
P (s1, . . . , sl, w1, . . . , wk) ∧ s = (s1, . . . , sl) ∧ w = (w1, . . . , wk),
hence, R is only defined over pairs of vectors of lengths l and k.
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patched by S. Proof system (Prove,Verify) satisfies simulation
sound extractability if there exists a PPT algorithm K, such
that for all PPT adversaries A and coins r, there exists a
negligible function µ, such that for all security parameters k,
we have45
Pr[P← ();Q← AH,P(—; r);W← KA′(H,P,Q) :
|Q| 6= |W| ∨ ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , |Q|} . (Q[j][1],W[j]) 6∈ R ∧
∀(s, σ) ∈ Q, (t, τ) ∈ P . Verify(s, σ, k) = 1 ∧ σ 6= τ ] ≤ µ(k)
where A(—; r) denotes running adversary A with an empty
input and random coins r, where H is a transcript of the
random oracle’s input and output, and where oracles A′ and
P are defined below:
• A′(). Computes Q′ ← A(—; r), forwarding any of A’s
oracle calls to K, and outputs Q′. By running A(—; r),
K is rewinding the adversary.
• P(s). Computes σ ← S(s);P ← (P[1], . . . ,P[|P|],
(s, σ)) and outputs σ.
Algorithm K is an extractor for (Prove,Verify).
Our definition of simulation sound extractability in the random
oracle model is an analogue of Groth’s definition in the
common reference string model [69, §2]. (See Bernhard et
al. [21, §1] for a detailed comparison.) Our presentation of
simulation sound extractability differs from the presentation
by Bernhard et al. [21] by formalizing some of the details.
Bernhard et al. [21] show that non-interactive proof systems
derived using the Fiat-Shamir transformation satisfy zero-
knowledge and simulation sound extractability:
Theorem 12 (from [21]). Let Σ be a sigma protocol for
relation R, and let H be a random oracle. If Σ satisfies
special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge,
then FS(Σ,H) satisfies zero-knowledge and simulation sound
extractability.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation can be generalized to in-
clude an optional string m in the hashes produced by functions
Prove and Verify. We write Prove(s, w,m, k) and Verify(s,
(comm, resp),m, k) for invocations of Prove and Verify which
include an optional string. When m is provided, it is included
in the hashes in both algorithms. That is, given FS(Σ,H) =
(Prove,Verify), the hashes are computed as follows in both
algorithms: chal ← H(comm, s,m). Theorem 12 can be
extended to this generalization.
APPENDIX B
VARIANTS OF Exp-IV
Our individual verifiability experiment with external au-
thentication (§II-B1) can be equivalently formulated as an
experiment that challenges A to predict the output of Vote:
Exp-IV-Ext′(Π,A, k) =
(PK T , nC , β, b)← A(k);1
b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k);2
if b = b′ ∧ b′ 6= ⊥ then3
return 14
else5
return 06
Proposition 13. Given an election scheme Π, we have
∀A ∃µ ∀k . Succ(Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k)
⇔ ∀A′ ∃µ′ ∀k′ . Succ(Exp-IV-Ext′(Π,A′, k′)) ≤ µ′(k′),
where A and A′ are PPT adversaries, µ and µ′ are negligible
functions, and k and k′ are security parameters.
Intuitively, if A can predict the output of Vote, then A can use
that prediction to generate a collision. And if A can generate
collisions, then A can use them to predict outputs.
Proof. For the forward implication, suppose A′ is a PPT
adversary such that Succ(Exp-IV-Ext′(Π,A′, k′)) > 1p(k′)
for some polynomial function p and security parame-
ter k′. We construct an adversary A against Exp-IV-Ext.
On input k′, adversary A computes (PK T , nC , β, b) ←
A′(k′) and outputs (PK T , nC , β, β). Since A′ wins
Exp-IV-Ext′ with non-negligible probability, we have
Pr[b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k′) : b = b′ ∧ b 6= ⊥] > 1
p(k′)
.
Moreover, since calls to algorithm Vote are independent, we
have
Pr[b1 ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k′);
b2 ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k′)
: b1 = b ∧ b2 = b ∧ b1 6= ⊥ ∧ b2 6= ⊥] > 1
p(k′)2
.
It follows that Succ(Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k′)) > 1p(k′)2 .
For the reverse implication, sup-
pose A is a PPT adversary such that
Succ(Exp-IV-Ext(Π,A, k)) > 1p(k) for some polynomial
function p and security parameter k. We construct an adversary
A′ against Exp-IV-Ext′. On input k, adversary A′ computes
(PK T , nC , β1, β2)← A(k); b1 ← Vote(PK T , nC , β1, k) and
outputs (PK T , nC , β2, b1). Since A wins Exp-IV-Ext with
probability no less than 1p(k) , we have
Pr[b2 ← Vote(PK T , nC , β2, k) : b1 = b2 ∧ b1 6= ⊥] > 1
p(k)
.
It follows that Succ(Exp-IV-Int′(Π,A′, k)) > 1p(k) .
Our individual verifiability experiment with internal authen-
tication (§IV-B1) can also be reformulated as an experiment
that challenges A to predict the output of Vote algorithms:
45. We extend set membership notation to vectors: we write x ∈ x if x is
an element of the set {x[i] : 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|}
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Exp-IV-Int′(Π,A, k) =
(PK T , nV )← A(k);1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k)2
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };3
Crpt ← ∅;4
(nC , β, i, b)← AC(L);5
b′ ← Vote(ski,PK T , nC , β, k);6
if b = b′ ∧ b′ 6= ⊥ ∧ sk i 6∈ Crpt then7
return 18
else9
return 010
Similarly to Section IV-B1, the adversary is given access to
oracle C and the voter index output on line 5 must be legal
with respect to nV .
Experiment Exp-IV-Int′ is strictly stronger than our original
experiment Exp-IV-Int, since predicting the output of Vote
does not imply the existence of collisions, whereas collisions
can be used to predict the output of Vote. For instance,
consider the following variant of Nonce (Definition 5):
Definition 24. Election scheme Nonce′ is defined as follows:
• Setup(k) outputs (⊥,⊥,∞,∞).
• Register(PK T , k) computes r ∈ Z2k and outputs (r, r).
• Vote(r,PK T , nC , β, k) outputs (r, β).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k) computes a vector X of length
nC , such that X is a tally of the votes on BB for which
the nonce is in L, and outputs (X,⊥).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X, P, k) outputs 1 if (X, P ) =
Tally(⊥,⊥,BB , L, nC , k) and 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, an adversary can predict the output of Vote,
because the algorithm is deterministic and the electoral roll
lists private credentials. However, the Register algorithm en-
sures that voters’ credentials are distinct with overwhelming
probability, hence, instantiations of the Vote algorithm with
distinct voter credentials will never collide.
Proposition 14. Given an election scheme Π, PPT adver-
sary A, negligible function µ, and security parameter k, if
Succ(Exp-IV-Int′(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k), then there exists a PPT
adversary B such that Succ(Exp-IV-Int(Π,B, k)) ≤ µ(k).
The proof of Proposition 14 is similar to the reverse implica-
tion proof of Proposition 13.
APPENDIX C
GENERALIZED HELIOS SCHEME
We formalize a generic construction for Helios-like election
schemes (Figure 1). Our construction is parameterized on
the choice of homomorphic encryption scheme and sigma
protocols.
Setup generates the tallier’s key pair. The public key in-
cludes a non-interactive proof that the key pair is correctly
constructed. Vote takes a choice β ∈ {1, . . . , nC} and outputs
ciphertexts c1, . . . , cnC−1 such that if β < nC , then ciphertext
cβ contains plaintext 1 and the remaining ciphertexts contain
plaintext 0, otherwise, all ciphertexts contain plaintext 0. Vote
also outputs proofs σ1, ..., σnC so that this can be verified,
in particular, proof σj demonstrates that the ciphertext cj
contains 0 or 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1, and the proof σnC
demonstrates that the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts
c1⊗· · ·⊗cnC contains 0 or 1 (i.e., the voter’s ballot contains a
vote for exactly one candidate). Tally homomorphically com-
bines ciphertexts representing votes for a particular candidate
and decrypts the homomorphic combinations. The number of
votes for a candidate β ∈ {1, . . . , nC − 1} is simply the
homomorphic combination of the ballots for that candidate;
the number of votes for candidate nC is equal to the number of
votes for all other candidates subtracted from the total number
of valid ballots on the bulletin board. Verify checks that each
of the above steps has been performed correctly.
Lemmata 15–17 demonstrate that generalized Helios is a
construction for election schemes.
Lemma 15. Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) satisfies Correctness,
where Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the preconditions of
Figure 1.
The proof of Lemma 15 is similar to the proof of Proposi-
tion 21.
Lemma 16. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the
preconditions of Figure 1. Further suppose that Σ2 satisfies
special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge,
and H is a random oracle. We have Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H)
satisfies Completeness.
Proof. Let Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) = (Setup,Vote,Tally,
Verify), FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey), FS(Σ2,H) =
(ProveCiph,VerCiph), and FS(Σ3,H) = (ProveDec,
VerDec). Suppose k is a security parameter, BB is a bulletin
board, and nC is an integer. Further suppose (PK T ,SK T ) is
a key pair, mB and mC are integers, and (X, P ) is a tally,
such that (PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k) and (X, P )←
Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k). Moreover, suppose |BB | ≤ mB . We
focus on the case nC > 1; the case nC = 1 is similar. By
definition of Setup, there exist coins s such that (pk , sk ,m) =
Gen(k; s), PK T ← (pk ,m, ρ), SK T ← (pk , sk) and mB
is the largest integer such that {0, . . . ,mB} ⊆ m, where ρ
is an output of ProveKey((k, pk ,m), (sk , s), k). By definition
of Tally, we have X is a vector of length nC and P is a
vector of length nC−1. It follows that Verify can successfully
parse X, P , and PK T . Moreover, by the completeness of
(ProveKey,VerKey), we have VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1
with overwhelming probability. Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest
subset of BB satisfying the conditions given by the tally
algorithm. If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅, then X is a zero-filled vector
and Verify outputs 1, concluding our proof, otherwise, we
proceed as follows. Since {b1, . . . , b`} is a subset of BB , we
have ` ≤ mB . By definition of Tally, we have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `
that
∧nC−1
j=1 VerCiph((pk , bi[j], {0, 1}), bi[j+nC − 1], j, k) =
1. By Theorem 12, we have (ProveCiph,VerCiph) satisfies
simulation sound extractability, hence, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `
and all 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 we have bi[j] is a ciphertext with
overwhelming probability. It follows for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1
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Fig. 1 Generalized Helios
Suppose Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is an additively homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme with a message space that, for
sufficiently large security parameters, includes {0, 1}, Σ1 proves correct key construction, Σ2 proves plaintext knowledge in
a subspace, Σ3 proves correct decryption, and H is a hash function. Let FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey), FS(Σ2,H) =
(ProveCiph,VerCiph), and FS(Σ3,H) = (ProveDec,VerDec). We define generalized Helios Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) =
(Setup,Vote,Tally,Verify) as follows.
• Setup(k). Select coins s, compute (pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k; s); ρ ← ProveKey((k, pk ,m), (sk , s), k); PK T ←
(pk ,m, ρ); SK T ← (pk , sk), let m be the largest integer such that {0, . . . ,m} ⊆ m, and output (PK T ,SK T ,m,m).
• Vote(PK T , nC , β, k). Parse PK T as a vector (pk ,m, ρ). Output ⊥ if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1∨ β 6∈
{1, . . . , nC}. Select coins r1, . . . , rnC−1 and compute:
for 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 do
if j = β then mj ← 1 else mj ← 0
cj ← Enc(pk ,mj ; rj);
σj ← ProveCiph((pk , cj , {0, 1}), (mj , rj), j, k)
c← c1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ cnC−1;
m← m1  · · · mnC−1;
r ← r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rnC−1;
σnC ← ProveCiph((pk , c, {0, 1}), (m, r), nC , k)
Output ballot (c1, . . . , cnC−1, σ1, . . . , σnC ).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k). Initialize vectors X of length nC and P of length nC−1. Compute for 1 ≤ j ≤ nC do X[j]← 0.
Parse SK T as a vector (pk , sk). Output (X,P) if parsing fails. Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of BB such that
b1 < · · · < b` and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have bi is a vector of length 2·nC−1 and
∧nC−1
j=1 VerCiph((pk , bi[j], {0, 1}), bi[j+
nC − 1], j, k) = 1 ∧ VerCiph((pk , bi[1] ⊗ · · · ⊗ bi[nC − 1], {0, 1}), bi[2 · nC − 1], nC , k) = 1. If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅, then
output (X,P), otherwise, compute:
for 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 do
c← b1[j]⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[j];
X[j]← Dec(sk , c);
P[j]← ProveDec((pk , c,X[j]), sk , k)
X[nC ]← `−
∑nC−1
j=1 X[j];
Output (X,P).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X,P, k). Parse X as a vector of length nC , parse P as a vector of length nC − 1, parse PK T as
a vector (pk ,m, ρ). Output 0 if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1. Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of
BB satisfying the conditions given by the tally algorithm and let mB be the largest integer such that {0, . . . ,mB} ⊆ m.
If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅ ∧
∧nC
j=1X[j] = 0 or
∧nC−1
j=1 VerDec((pk , b1[j] ⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[j],X[j]),P[j], k) = 1 ∧ X[nC ] = ` −∑nC−1
j=1 X[j] ∧ 1 ≤ ` ≤ mB , then output 1, otherwise, output 0.
The above algorithms assume nC > 1 and we define special cases of Vote, Tally and Verify when nC = 1:
• Vote(PK T , nC , β, k). Parse PK T as a vector (pk ,m, ρ). Output ⊥ if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1∨β 6= 1.
Select coins r, compute m← 1; c← Enc(pk ,m; r);σ ← ProveCiph((pk , c, {0, 1}), (m, r), k), and output ballot (c, σ).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , k). Initialize X and P as vectors of length 1. Compute X[1]← 0. Parse SK T as a vector (pk , sk).
Output (X,P) if parsing fails. Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of BB such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have bi is
a vector of length 2 and VerCiph((pk , bi[1], {0, 1}), bi[2], k) = 1. If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅, then output (X,P). Otherwise,
compute c← b1[1]⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[1];X[1]← Dec(sk , c);P[1]← ProveDec((pk , c,X[1]), sk , k) and output (X,P).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X,P, k). Parse X and P as vectors of length 1, and parse PK T as a vector (pk ,m, ρ). Output 0 if
parsing fails or VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1. Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of BB satisfying the conditions given
by the tally algorithm and let mB be the largest integer such that {0, . . . ,mB} ⊆ m. If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅ ∧X[1] = 0 or
VerDec((pk , b1[1]⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[1],X[1]),P[1], k) = 1 ∧ 1 ≤ ` ≤ mB , then output 1, otherwise, output 0.
that b1[j] ⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[j] is a ciphertext with overwhelming
probability. By definition of Tally and the completeness
of (ProveDec,VerDec), we have
∧nC−1
j=1 VerDec((pk , b1[j]⊗
· · · ⊗ b`[j],X[j]), P [j], k) = 1 ∧ X[nC ] = ` −
∑nC−1
j=1 X[j]
with overwhelming probability, hence, Verify outputs 1 with
overwhelming probability, concluding our proof.
Definition 25 (Collision-free). Suppose Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
is an asymmetric encryption scheme, Σ1 proves correct key
construction, H is a hash function, and m is a message space.
Let FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey). If for all security
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parameters k, public keys pk , proofs ρ, messages m1,m2 ∈ m,
and coins r1 and r2, we have
VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1 ∧ (m1 6= m2 ∨ r1 6= r2)
⇒ Enc(pk ,m1; r1) 6= Enc(pk ,m2; r2)
Then we say Γ is collision-free for m.
Lemma 17. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the
preconditions of Figure 1. Further suppose Γ is collision-
free for {0, 1}. We have Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) satisfies
Injectivity.
Proof. Let Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) = (Setup,Vote,Tally,
Verify), Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec), and FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,
VerKey). Suppose k is a security parameter, PK T is a public
key, nC is an integer, and β and β′ are choices such that
β 6= β′. Further suppose b and b′ are ballots such that
b ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k), b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β′, k),
b 6= ⊥, and b′ 6= ⊥. By definition of Vote, we have PK T is a
vector (pk ,m, ρ) and VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1. Moreover,
there exist coins r and r′ such that
b[1] = Enc(pk ,m; r), where m =
{
1 if β = 1
0 otherwise
and
b′[1] = Enc(pk ,m′; r′), where m′ =
{
1 if β′ = 1
0 otherwise
Since β 6= β′, we have m 6= m′. Furthermore, since Γ if
collision-free for {0, 1}, we have b[1] 6= b′[1] and, therefore,
b 6= b′.
APPENDIX D
PROOF: HELIOS 2.0 IS NOT VERIFIABLE
Bernhard et al. [21] demonstrate that Helios 2.0 [5] is
not verifiable and we show that Helios 2.0 does not satisfy
Ver-Ext.
Definition 26 (Weak Fiat-Shamir transformation [21]). The
weak Fiat-Shamir transformation is a function wFS that is
identical to FS, except that it excludes statement s in the
hashes computed by Prove and Verify, as follows: chal ←
H(comm).
Definition 27 (Helios 2.0). Let Ĥelios be Helios after replac-
ing all instances of the Fiat-Shamir transformation with the
weak Fiat-Shamir transformation and excluding the (optional)
messages input to ProveCiph—i.e., ProveCiph should be used
as a ternary function. Helios 2.0 is Ĥelios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H),
where Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H are given in Definition 28.
Proposition 18. Helios 2.0 does not satisfy Ver-Ext.
Our proof of Proposition 18 formalizes the attack by Bernhard
et al. [21, §3] in the context of our universal verifiability
experiment.
Proof. Let Vote and Tally be the vote and tallying algo-
rithms defined by Helios 2.0. Moreover, let wFS(Σ1,H) =
Fig. 2 Adversary against Helios 2.0
Given a security parameter k as input, A computes primes p
and 1 such that p = 2 · q + 1 and q is of length k. A also
computes a generator g of the multiplicative group Z∗p. Let
nC ← 2 and m← Nq−1, moreover, let m > 1 be an element
of m. The adversary proceeds as follows:
%coins1
(a0, b0, a1, b1)←R Z4q;2
%witnesses3
A0 ← ga0 (mod p);4
B0 ← gb0 (mod p);5
A1 ← ga1 (mod p);6
B1 ← gb1 (mod p);7
%challenge hash8
c← H(A0, B0, A1, B1) (mod q);9
%private key10
x← (b0+c·m)·(1−m)−b1·ma0·(1−m)−a1·m (mod q);11
%challenges12
c1 ← b1−a1·x1−m (mod q);13
c0 ← c− c1 (mod q);14
%coins15
r ←R Zq;16
%responses17
f0 ← a0 + c0 · r (mod q);18
f1 ← a1 + c1 · r (mod q);19
%proof of plaintext knowledge20
σ ← (A0, B0, c0, f0, A1, B1, c1, f1);21
%public key22
h← gx (mod p); pk ← (p, q, g, h);23
%proof of correct key construction24
ρ← ProveKey((k, pk ,m), (x, r′), k);25
%ciphertext26
e← (gr mod p, hr · gm mod p);27
%bulletin board28
BB ← {(e, σ, σ)};29
%tally30
X← (m, 1−m);31
%proof of decryption32
P← (ProveDec((pk , e,m), x, k));33
return ((pk ,m, ρ),BB , nC ,X, P )34
where r′ is computed such that (pk , x,m) = Gen(k; r′).
(ProveKey,VerKey), wFS(Σ2,H) = (ProveCiph,VerCiph)
and wFS(Σ3,H) = (ProveDec,VerDec). We construct an
adversary A (Figure 2) against the universal verifiability
experiment.
Suppose an execution of Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k) computes
(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P )← A(k);
Y ← correct-tally(pk ,BB , nC , k)
Since m > 1, there is no choice β ∈ {1, 2} nor coins r
such that Vote(PK T , nC , β, k; r) ∈ BB . By definition of
function correct-tally , we have Y = (0, 0). Moreover, since
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X = (m, 1 − m), we have X 6= Y and X[2] = 1 − X[1].
Let us show that Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) = 1. By
definition of Verify, we have PK T is a vector (pk ,m, ρ).
Moreover, by the completeness of (ProveKey,VerKey) and
(ProveDec,VerDec), we have VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1
and VerDec((pk , e,X[1]),P[1], k) = 1. It remains to show
that BB is the largest subset of BB satisfying the conditions
given by the Tally algorithm. Since BB = {(e, σ, σ)} and
(e, σ, σ) is a vector of length 2 ·nC−1, it suffices to show that
VerCiph((pk , e, {0, 1}), σ, k) = 1. Let us recall the definition
of VerCiph (cf. [47, Figure 1] and Definition 26):
• VerCiph((pk , e, {0, 1}), σ, k). Parses pk as (p, q, g, h),
e as (R,S), and σ as (A0, B0, c0, f0, A1, B1, c1, f1),
outputting 0 if parsing fails. If gf0 ≡ A0 ·Rc0 (mod p)∧
hf0 ≡ B0·Sc0 (mod p)∧gf1 ≡ A1·Rc1 (mod p)∧hf1 ≡
B1 · (S/g)c1 (mod p) ∧ H(A0, B0, A1, B1) ≡ c0 + c1
(mod p), then output 1, otherwise, output 0.
We have
gf0 ≡ ga0+c0·r ≡ ga0 · (gr)c0 ≡ A0 ·Rc0 (mod p)
gf1 ≡ ga1+c1·r ≡ ga1 · (gr)c1 ≡ A1 ·Rc1 (mod p)
Moreover, we have hf0 ≡ gx(a0+c0·r) (mod p) and B0 ·Sc0 ≡
gb0+c0(x·r+m) (mod p), hence, to show hf0 ≡ B0 · Sc0
(mod p), it is sufficient to show (b0+c0 ·m) ≡ x·a0 (mod q):
b0 + c0 ·m
≡ b0 + c ·m−m · c1
≡ b0 + c ·m− b1·m−a1·m·x1−m
≡ (b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m+a1·m·x1−m
≡ (b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m+
a1·m·((b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m)
a0(1−m)−a1·m
1−m
≡ (a0(1−m)−a1·m)((b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m)(1−m)(a0(1−m)−a1·m)
+a1·m((b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m)(1−m)(a0(1−m)−a1·m)
≡ a0(1−m)((b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m)(1−m)(a0(1−m)−a1·m)
≡ a0·((b0+c·m)(1−m)−b1·m)a0(1−m)−a1·m
≡ x · a0 (mod q)
Similarly, hf1 ≡ gx(a1+c1·r) (mod p) and B1 · (S/g)c1 ≡
gb1+c1(x·r+m−1) (mod p), hence, to show hf1 ≡ B1 ·(S/g)c1
(mod p), it is sufficient to show b1 + c1(m − 1) ≡ a1 · x
(mod q):
b1 + c1(m− 1)
≡ b1 + (m−1)(b1−a1·x)1−m
≡ b1(1−m)+(m−1)(b1−a1·x)1−m
≡ a1·x(1−m)1−m
≡ a1 · x (mod q)
Furthermore, we have
H(A0, B0, A1, B1) ≡ c0 + c1 ≡ c− c1 + c1
≡ H(A0, B0, A1, B1)− c1 + c1 (mod p)
It follows that VerCiph((pk , e, {0, 1}), σ, k) = 1, concluding
our proof.
APPENDIX E
HELIOS’16 SCHEME
Generalized Helios (Figure 1) can be instantiated to derive
Helios’16:
Definition 28 (Helios’16). Helios’16 is Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,
H), where Γ is additively homomorphic El Gamal [48, §2],
Σ1 is the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of discrete
logarithms by Chaum et al. [31, Protocol 2], Σ2 is the sigma
protocol for proving knowledge of disjunctive equality between
discrete logarithms by Cramer et al. [47, Figure 1], Σ3 is
the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of equality between
discrete logarithms by Chaum and Pedersen [32, §3.2], and
H is a random oracle.
Although Helios actually uses SHA-256 [101], we assume
that H is a random oracle to prove Theorem 4. Moreover,
we assume the sigma protocols used by Helios’16 satisfy the
preconditions of generalized Helios—that is, [31, Protocol 2]
is a sigma protocol for proving correct key construction, [47,
Figure 1] is a sigma protocol for proving plaintext knowledge
in a subspace, and [32, §3.2] is a sigma protocol for proving
decryption. We leave formally proving this assumption as
future work.
To show that Helios’16 is an election scheme, we must
demonstrate that Correctness, Completeness and Injectivity are
satisfied. Correctness follows immediately from Lemma 15.
And we show that Completeness and Injectivity are also
satisfied.
First, Completeness. Bernhard et al. [21, §4] remark that
the sigma protocol used by Helios’16 to prove plaintext
knowledge in a subspace satisfies satisfy special soundness
and special honest verifier zero-knowledge, hence, Helios’16
satisfies Completeness by Lemma 16.
Secondly, Injectivity. A non-interactive proof system
(ProveKey,VerKey) derived from a sigma protocol for prov-
ing correct key construction is sufficient to ensure that El
Gamal is collision-free, assuming algorithm VerKey guaran-
tees that public keys are constructed from suitable parameters:
if VerKey((k, pk , {0, 1}), ρ, k) = 1, then there exists p, q, g
and h such that pk = (p, q, g, h) and (p, q, g) are crypto-
graphic parameters—i.e., p = 2 · q + 1, |q| = k, and g is a
generator of Z∗p of order q.
Lemma 19. Suppose Σ1 is a sigma protocol that proves
correct key construction and H is a hash function. Let
FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey). Further suppose for all
security parameters k, public keys pk , and proofs ρ, we have
VerKey((k, pk , {0, 1}), ρ, k) = 1 implies h 6= 0 and there
exists p, q, g and h such that pk = (p, q, g, h) and (p, q, g)
are cryptographic parameters. It follows that additively homo-
morphic El Gamal is collision-free for {0, 1}.
Proof. Suppose k is a security parameter, pk is a public key,
ρ is a proof, m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1} are messages and r1 and r2
are coins such that VerKey((k, pk , {0, 1}), ρ, k) = 1, m1 6=
m2∨ r1 6= r2, pk = (p, q, g, h) and (p, q, g) are cryptographic
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parameters, for some p, q, g and h. Further suppose that
c1 and c2 are ciphertexts such that c1 = Enc(pk ,m1; r1),
c2 = Enc(pk ,m2; r2), and Enc is El Gamal’s encryption
algorithm. If r1 6= r2, then we proceed as follows. By def-
inition of Enc, we have c1[1] = gr1 (mod p) and c2[1] = gr2
(mod p). Since r1 and r2 are distinct, we have gr1 6≡ gr2
(mod p). (We implicitly assume that coins r1 and r2 are
selected from the coin space Z∗q , hence, gr1 = gr1 mod p
and gr2 = gr2 mod p.) It follows that c1 6= c2. Otherwise
(r1 = r2), we have m1 6= m2 and we proceed as follows.
By definition of Enc, we have c1[2] = hr1 · gm1 (mod p) and
c2[2] = h
r2 · gm2 (mod p). Since (p, q, g) are cryptographic
parameters and h 6= 0, we have hr1 6≡ hr1 ·g (mod p), which
is sufficient to conclude, because m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1}.
The sigma protocol for proving knowledge of discrete log-
arithms by Chaum et al. [31, Protocol 2] does not explic-
itly require the suitability of cryptographic parameters to be
checked, hence, Lemma 19 is not immediately applicable.
Nonetheless, we can trivially make the necessary checks
explicit and, hence, the non-interactive proof system derived
from the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of discrete
logarithms by Chaum et al. is sufficient to ensure that El Gamal
is collision-free. It follows that Helios’16 satisfies Injectivity,
hence, Helios’16 is an election scheme.
APPENDIX F
PROOF: HELIOS’16 IS VERIFIABLE
Elections schemes constructed from generalized Helios sat-
isfy individual (§F-A) and universal (§F-B) verifiability, hence,
such schemes satisfy election verifiability with external au-
thentication (§F-C). It follows that Helios’16 satisfies election
verifiability (§F-D).
A. Individual verifiability
Proposition 20. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the
preconditions of Figure 1. Further suppose that Γ is collision-
free for {0, 1}. We have Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) satisfies
individual verifiability.
The proof of Proposition 20 is similar to the proof of
Lemma 17.
Proof. Let Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) = (Setup,Vote,Tally,
Verify) and FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey). Suppose k
is a security parameter, PK T is a public key, nC is an
integer, and β and β′ are choices. Further suppose that b
and b′ are ballots such that b ← Vote(PK T , nC , β, k),
b′ ← Vote(PK T , nC , β′, k), b 6= ⊥, and b′ 6= ⊥. By
definition of Vote, we have PK T parses as a vector (pk ,m, ρ)
and VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1. Moreover, b[1] and b′[1]
are ciphertexts such that b[1] ← Enc(pk ,m) and b′[1] ←
Enc(pk ,m′), where m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, the ci-
phertexts are constructed using random coins—i.e., the coins
used by b[1] and b′[1] will be distinct with overwhelming
probability. Since Γ is collision-free for {0, 1}, we have
b[1] 6= b′[1] and b 6= b′ with overwhelming probability,
concluding our proof.
B. Universal verifiability
Proposition 21. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the
preconditions of Figure 1. Further suppose that Σ1, Σ2
and Σ3 satisfy special soundness and special honest veri-
fier zero-knowledge, and H is a random oracle. We have
Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) satisfies universal verifiability.
Proof. Let Π = Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) = (Setup,Vote,
Tally,Verify), FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey), FS(Σ2,
H) = (ProveCiph,VerCiph), and FS(Σ3,H) = (ProveDec,
VerDec). By Theorem 12, each of the non-interactive proof
systems satisfies simulation sound extractability.
Suppose k is a security parameter and A is a PPT adversary.
Further suppose that an execution of Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k)
computes
(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P )← A(k);
Y ← correct-tally(PK T ,BB , nC , k)
such that Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) = 1. (If Verify(
PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) 6= 1, then we can conclude imme-
diately.) We focus on the case nC > 1; the case nC = 1 is
similar.
By definition of the verification algorithm, vector X is of
length nC and P is a vector of length nC−1. Moreover, PK T
is a vector (pk ,m, ρ). Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of
BB such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have bi is a vector of length
2 ·nC − 1 and
∧nC−1
j=1 VerCiph((pk , bi[j], {0, 1}), bi[j+nC −
1], j, k) = 1∧VerCiph((pk , bi[1]⊗· · ·⊗bi[nC−1], {0, 1}), bi[2·
nC − 1], nC , k) = 1.
We have for all choices β ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, coins r and
ballots b = Vote(PK T , nC , β, k; r) that b 6∈ BB \{b1, . . . , b`}
with overwhelming probability, since such an occurrence
would imply a contradiction: {b1, . . . , b`} is not the largest
subset of BB satisfying the conditions given by the tally
algorithm, because b is a vector of length 2 · nC − 1 such
that
∧nC−1
j=1 VerCiph((pk , b[j], {0, 1}), b[j + nC − 1], j, k) =
1 ∧ VerCiph((pk , b[1] ⊗ · · · ⊗ b[nC − 1], {0, 1}), b[2 · nC −
1], nC , k) = 1 with overwhelming probability, but b 6∈
{b1, . . . , b`}. It follows that:
correct-tally(PK T ,BB , nC , k)
= correct-tally(PK T , {b1, . . . , b`}, nC , k) (1)
A proof of (1) follows from the definition of function
correct-tally .
We proceed by distinguishing two cases.
Case I: {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅. By definition of function
correct-tally and (1), we have Y is a vector of length nC
such that
∧nC
j=1Y[j] = 0. Since
∧nC
i=jX[j] = 0, we have
X = Y by definition of the verification algorithm.
Case II: {b1, . . . , b`} 6= ∅. By definition of the verification
algorithm, we have VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1. Moreover,
by simulation sound extractability, we are assured that pk is
an output of Gen with overwhelming probability—i.e., there
exists s and sk such that (pk , sk ,m) = Gen(k; s).
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By simulation sound extractability, with overwhelming
probability, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` there exists messages mi,1,
. . . ,mi,nC−1 ∈ {0, 1} and coins ri,1, . . . , ri,2·nC−2 such that
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 we have
bi[j + nC − 1] = ProveCiph((pk , bi[j], {0, 1}),
(mi,j , ri,j), j, k; ri,j+nC−1)
and
bi[j] = Enc(pk ,mi,j ; ri,j).
Moreover, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have ∑nC−1j=1 mi,j ∈ {0, 1}
and there exist coins ri,2·nC−1 such that
bi[2 · nC − 1] = ProveCiph(pk , c, {0, 1}),
(m, r), nC , k; ri,2·nC−1)
with overwhelming probability, where c← bi[1]⊗· · ·⊗bi[nC−
1], m← mi,1 · · · mi,nC−1, and r ← ri,1⊕ · · · ⊕ ri,nC−1.
By inspection of Vote, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` there exists βi, ri
such that
bi = Vote(PK T , nC , βi, k; ri)
and either βi = nC ∧
∧nC−1
j=1 mi,j = 0 or βi ∈ {1, . . . , nC −
1} ∧ mi,βi = 1 ∧
∧
j∈{1,...,βi−1,βi+1,...,nC−1}mi,j = 0. It
follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 that:
mi,j = 0⇐⇒ βi = nC ∨ βi 6= j (2)
mi,j = 1⇐⇒ βi = j (3)
Moreover, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have:
nC−1∑
j=1
mi,j = 0⇐⇒ βi = nC (4)
Furthermore, we have the following facts:
Fact 1. For all integers β and k such that 1 ≤ β ≤ nC , we
have:
∃=kb ∈ ({b1, . . . , b`} \ {⊥}) :
∃r : b = Vote(PK T , nC , β, k; r)
⇐⇒ ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : β = βi
Fact 2. For all integers j and k such that 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1,
we have:
∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : βi = j ⇐⇒ k =
∑`
i=1
mi,j
Proof of Fact 2. For the forward implication, suppose j, k are
integers such that 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 and ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} :
βi = j. We proceed by induction on `. In the base case
(` = 0), we have k = 0, hence, k =
∑`
i=1mi,j . In the
inductive case, we distinguish two cases. Case I: ∃=ki ∈
{1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = j holds. We have β` 6= j by definition
of the counting quantifier and, hence, mi,j = 0 by (2). By our
induction hypothesis, we derive k =
∑`−1
i=1 mi,j =
∑`
i=1mi,j .
Case II: ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = j does not hold.
We have β` = j by definition of the counting quantifier
and, hence, mi,j = 1 by (3). Moreover, we have ∃=k−1i ∈
{1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = j holds. By our induction hypothesis,
we derive k − 1 = ∑`−1i=1 mi,j , that is, k = ∑`i=1mi,j .
For the reverse implication, suppose j, k are integers such
that 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 and k =
∑`
i=1mi,j . We proceed by
induction on `. In the base case (` = 0), we have k = 0,
hence, ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : βi = j. In the inductive case,
we distinguish two cases. Case I: k =
∑`−1
i=1 mi,j . We have
m`,j = 0, hence, β` 6= j by (2). By our induction hypothesis,
we have ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = j. Since β` 6= j, the
result follows. Case II: k 6= ∑`−1i=1 mi,j . Since m`,j ∈ {0, 1},
we have m`,j = 1, hence, β` = j by (3). Moreover, we have
k − 1 = ∑`−1i=1 mi,j . By our induction hypothesis, we derive
∃=k−1i ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} : βi = j. The result follows.
Fact 3. For all integers k, we have
∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : βi = nC ⇐⇒ k = `−
nC−1∑
j=1
∑`
i=1
mi,j
Proof of Fact 3. For the forward implication, suppose ∃=ki ∈
{1, . . . , `} : βi = nC . We proceed by induction on `.
In the base case (` = 0), we have k = 0, hence,
k = ` − ∑nC−1j=1 ∑`i=1mi,j . In the inductive case, we
distinguish two cases. Case I: ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} :
βi = nC holds. We have β` 6= nC by definition of
the counting quantifier and we derive
∑nC−1
j=1 m`,j 6= 0
by (4). Moreover, since
∑nC−1
j=1 m`,j ∈ {0, 1}, we have∑nC−1
j=1 m`,j = 1. By our induction hypothesis, we derive
k = ` − 1 −∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j = ` −∑nC−1j=1 ∑`i=1mi,j .
Case II: ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = nC does not hold.
We have β` = nC by definition of the counting quantifier
and we derive
∑nC−1
j=1 mi,j = 0 by (4). Moreover, we have
∃=k−1i ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} : βi = nC holds. By our induction
hypothesis, we derive k−1 = `−1−∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j , that
is, k = `−∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j = `−∑nC−1j=1 ∑`i=1mi,j .
For the reverse implication, suppose k = ` −∑nC−1
j=1
∑`
i=1mi,j . We proceed by induction on `. In the base
case (` = 0), we have k = 0, hence, ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : βi =
nC . In the inductive case, we distinguish two cases. Case I:
k = ` − 1 −∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j . We have ∑nC−1j=1 m`,j = 1.
Since m`,1, . . . ,m`,nC−1 ∈ {0, 1}, there exists j such that
1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 and m`,j = 1, moreover, β` = j by
(3), hence, β` 6= nC . By our induction hypothesis, we derive
∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} : βi = nC . The result follows. Case II:
k 6= `− 1−∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j . Since ∑nC−1j=1 m`,j ∈ {0, 1},
we have
∑nC−1
j=1 m`,j = 0, and we derive βi = nC by (4).
Moreover, we have k − 1 = ` − 1 −∑nC−1j=1 ∑`−1i=1 mi,j . By
our induction hypothesis, we derive ∃=k−1i ∈ {1, . . . , `− l} :
βi = nC . The result follows.
We proceed the proof of Proposition 21 using the above facts.
By definition of the verification algorithm, we have∧nC−1
j=1 VerDec((pk , b1[j] ⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[j],X[j]), P [j], k) = 1 ∧
X[nC ] = `−
∑nC−1
j=1 X[j]. By simulation sound extractability,
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we have for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nC − 1 that X[j] = Dec(sk ,
b1[j] ⊗ · · · ⊗ b`[j]) with overwhelming probability, hence,
X[j] = m1,j  · · ·  m`,j , with overwhelming probability.
Let mB be the largest integer such that {0, . . . ,mB} ⊆ m. By
definition of the verification algorithm, we have ` ≤ mB . It
follows that m1,j  · · · m`,j =
∑`
i=1mi,j , hence,
X[j] =
∑`
i=1
mi,j
with overwhelming probability. By definition of function
correct-tally , (1) and Fact 1, we have Y is a vector of length
nC such that for all 1 ≤ β ≤ nC we have
Y[β] = k if ∃=ki ∈ {1, . . . , `} : β = βi
It follows by Facts 2 and 3 that for all 1 ≤ β ≤ nC we have
X[β] = Y[β] with overwhelming probability, hence, X = Y
with overwhelming probability.
We have X = Y with overwhelming probability in both
cases—i.e., Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k) outputs 0 with overwhelm-
ing probability and Succ(Exp-UV-Ext(Π,A, k)) is negligible,
concluding our proof.
C. Election verifiability
By Propositions 20 & 21, election schemes constructed from
generalized Helios satisfy election verifiability with external
authentication:
Corollary 22. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 and H satisfy the
preconditions of Figure 1. Further suppose that Γ is collision-
free for {0, 1}, Σ1, Σ2 and Σ3 satisfy special soundness and
special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and H is a random
oracle. We have Helios(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,H) satisfies election
verifiability with external authentication.
D. Proof: Theorem 4
Our proof of Theorem 4 is reliant on Corollary 22. We have
already shown that the sigma protocol used by Helios’16 to
prove discrete logarithms is sufficient to ensure that El Gamal
is collision-free (Lemma 19), hence, it remains to show that the
sigma protocols used by Helios’16 satisfy special soundness
and special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Bernhard et al. [21, §4] remark that the sigma protocols
used by Helios’16 to prove discrete logarithms and equality
between discrete logarithms both satisfy special soundness and
special honest verifier zero-knowledge, hence, Theorem 12 is
applicable. Bernhard et al. also remark that the sigma protocol
for proving knowledge of disjunctive equality between discrete
logarithms satisfies special soundness and “almost special
honest verifier zero-knowledge” and argue that “we could
fix this[, but] it is easy to see that ... all relevant theorems
[including Theorem 12] still hold.” We adopt the same and
assume that Theorem 12 is applicable.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows from Corollary 22,
subject to the applicability of Theorem 12 to the sigma
protocol used by Helios’16 to prove knowledge of disjunctive
equality between discrete logarithms.
APPENDIX G
PROOF: Exp-EV-Int⇒ Exp-IV-Int
Our eligibility verifiability experiment (§IV-B3) asserts that
no one can construct a ballot that appears to be associated
with public credential pk unless they know private credential
sk . It follows that a voter can uniquely identify her ballot
on the bulletin board, because no one else knows her private
credential. Eligibility verifiability therefore implies individual
verifiability (Theorem 6).
Our proof of Theorem 6 is reliant on distinct credentials,
which is an consequence of eligibility verifiability:
Lemma 23. If an election scheme Π satisfies strong eligibility
verifiability, then there exists a negligible function µ, such that
for all security parameters k, we have
Pr [(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
(pk0, sk0)← Register(PK T , k);
(pk1, sk1)← Register(PK T , k) :
sk0 = sk1] ≤ µ(k)
Proof. Suppose an election scheme Π satisfies Exp-EV-Int,
but
Pr [(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC )← Setup(k);
(pk0, sk0)← Register(PK T , k);
(pk1, sk1)← Register(PK T , k) :
sk0 = sk1] ≥ 1
p(k)
for some polynomial function p and security parameter k.
Then we can construct an adversary A that wins Exp-EV-Int
as follows. Adversary A is given input k and runs Setup
to obtain a key pair (PK T ,SK T ), chooses some positive
integer nV , and outputs (PK T , nV ). The challenger then
generates nV key pairs and gives the set L of public keys
to A. Now A simply runs Register(PK T , k) to get a key
pair (pk , sk), chooses some positive integers nC and β such
that 1 ≤ β ≤ nC , computes b ← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k),
and outputs (nC , b). We know that secret keys generated by
Register collide with probability at least 1p(k) , so Register
must generate a particular secret key sk ′ with probability
1
p(k) . Therefore, this sk
′ will correspond to one of the public
keys in L with probability nVp(k) . Furthermore, the key sk
generated by the adversary will be sk ′ with probability 1p(k) .
Therefore, b will be a vote constructed under a voter’s secret
key with probability nVp(k)2 , so A wins the experiment with
non-negligible probability.
A. Proof: Theorem 6
Suppose there exists an adversary A′ that wins
Exp-IV-Int(Π,A′, k) with probability 1p(k) for some poly-
nomial function p. Then we can construct an adversary A
that wins Exp-EV-Int(Π,A, k) with non-negligible probability.
Adversary A is given k as input, which it passes to A′. Adver-
sary A′ may ask for secret keys from its oracle C, in which
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case A forwards these queries to its own, identical oracle. Ad-
versary A then forwards the oracle’s response back to A′. Ad-
versary A′ then outputs (PK T , nV ), which is then output by
A. Next, A is given the public keys (pk1, . . . , pknV ). Adver-
sary A passes these keys to A′, which returns (nC , β, β′, i, j).
Any oracle queries made by A′ are handled exactly as be-
fore. Now A queries its oracle C on i. The oracle returns
ski. Adversary A computes b = Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , β) and
outputs (nC , β′, j, b). Adversary A′ wins Exp-IV-Int(Π,A,
k) with non-negligible probability, so with non-negligible
probability b = Vote(sk j ,PK T , nC , β′) and A′ (and therefore
A) did not query the oracle on input j. Adversary A only
makes one additional oracle query on input i, so again, A
does not query the oracle on j. Furthermore, by Lemma 23,
ski = skj with only negligible probability. Therefore A wins
Exp-EV-Int(Π,A, k) with probability 1p(k) − negl(k).
APPENDIX H
JCJ SCHEME
We formalize a generic construction for JCJ-like election
schemes (Figure 3). Our construction is parameterized on
the choice of homomorphic encryption scheme and sigma
protocols.46 The specification of algorithms Setup, Register
and Vote follow from our informal descriptions (§VI).47 The
tallying algorithm performs the following steps:
1) Remove invalid ballots: The tallier discards any ballots
from the bulletin board for which proofs do not hold.
2) Eliminating duplicates: The tallier performs pairwise
PETs on the encrypted credentials and discard any ballots
for which a test holds, that is, ballots using the same
credential are discarded.48
3) Mixing: The tallier mixes the ciphertexts in the ballots
(i.e., the encrypted choices and the encrypted credentials),
using the same secret permutation for both mixes, hence,
the mix preserves the relation between encrypted choices
and credentials. Let C1 and C2 be the vectors output by
these mixes. The tallier also mixes the public credentials
published by the registrar. Let C3 be the vector output
by this mix.
4) Remove ineligible ballots: The tallier discards ciphertexts
C1[i] from C1 if there is no ciphertext c in C3 such that
a PET holds for c and C2[i], that is, ballots cast using
ineligible credentials are discarded.
5) Decrypting: The tallier decrypts the remaining encrypted
choices in C1 and proves that decryption was performed
correctly. The tallier identifies the winning candidate from
the decrypted choices.
The Verify algorithm checks that each of the above steps has
been performed correctly.
Lemmata 24–26 demonstrate that generalized JCJ is a
construction for election schemes.
Lemma 24. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5, Σ6 and H satisfy
the preconditions of Figure 3. We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,
Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies Correctness.
Proof. Our proof is by induction on the number of ballots
nB . We start with the base case, nB = 1. For all k, nC , and
β ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, we have
(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC)← Setup(k);
(pk , sk)← Register(PK T , k);
b← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k);
Y[β]← Y[β] + 1;
L← {pk};
BB ← {b};
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k);
Assume nC ≤ mC (otherwise, we trivially satisfy correct-
ness). Hence, we need to show X[β] = 1 and X[i] = 0 for
all i 6= β. By definition of Setup, we have PK T = (pkT ,
m, ρ), SK T = (pkT , skT ) and mC = |m|. By definition of
Vote, we have b = (c1, c2, σ, τ), where c1 = Enc(pkT , β; r1),
c2 = Enc(pkT , sk ; r2), σ = ProveCiph((pkT , c1, {1, . . . ,
nC}), (β, r1), k), and τ = ProveBind((pkT , c1, c2, ), (β, r1,
sk , r2), k). Since β ∈ {1, . . . , nC} and nC ≤ |m|, we have β
is a message in Γ’s message space
• Remove invalid ballots: This involves checking the proofs
σ and τ . Since they were honestly computed, they verify
with overwhelming probability.
• Remove duplicate ballots: Tally would check here if there
are multiple ballots computed using the same secret key.
Since there is only one ballot, this check passes trivially.
• Mixing: Tally mixes the ballots. Since there is only one
ballot, Tally will just re-encrypt the ballot. Let the re-
encryptions of b[1] and b[2] be b′[1] and b′[2], respectively.
This is done honestly, so b′[1] will still be an encryption
of β and b′[2] will still be an encryption of sk .
• Remove ineligible ballots: As mentioned, b′[2] is still an
encryption of sk , which is a valid secret key, so the ballot
is not eliminated.
• Decrypting: Finally, Tally computes β′ ←
Dec(skT , b
′[1]). Again, since b′[1] is still an encryption
of β, we have β′ = β. Tally then increments X[β] by 1.
Since we now have X[β] = 1 and X[i] = 0 for all i 6= β, we
have that JCJ satisfies correctness when nB = 1.
Now we assume that JCJ is correct for nB = n, and
prove that it satisfies correctness for nB = n + 1. First,
we note that since we are only adding one more vote, and
therefore only registering one more key pair, the probability
that skn+1 = sk i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , nB} is negligible,
46. For brevity, the encryption scheme’s message space m is assumed to
contain {1, . . . , |m|}.
47. Algorithm Setup bounds the maximum number of voters to a polynomial
in the security parameter to ensure that private voter credentials do not collide,
with overwhelming probability.
48. JCJ defines discarding ballots in accordance with a revoting policy [83,
§4.1]. However, we have shown that JCJ fails to satisfy universal verifiability
when the policy proposed by Juels et al. is adopted (§IV-B2). So, we consider
a policy that discards ballots using the same credential—i.e., choices by voters
that cast multiple ballots will be discarded.
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Fig. 3 Generalized JCJ
Suppose Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a multiplicatively homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme with a message space over
Z∗m for some integer m determined by the security parameter, e is an identity element of Γ’s message space with respect to ,
Σ1 proves correct key construction, Σ2 proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace, Σ3 proves conjunctive plaintext knowledge,
Σ4 proves correct decryption, Σ5 is a PET, Σ6 is a mixnet, and H is a hash function. Let FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey),
FS(Σ2,H) = (ProveCiph,VerCiph), FS(Σ3,H) = (ProveBind,VerBind), FS(Σ4,H) = (ProveDec,VerDec), FS(Σ5,H) =
(ProvePET,VerPET), and FS(Σ6,H) = (ProveMix,VerMix). We define generalized JCJ JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H) =
(Setup,Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) as follows.
• Setup(k). Select coins r, compute (pkT , skT ,m) ← Gen(k; r); ρ ← ProveKey((k, pkT ,m), (skT , r), k); PK T ←
(pkT ,m, ρ); SK T ← (pkT , skT );mC ← |m|, and output (PK T ,SK T , poly(k),mC).
• Register(PK T , k). Parse PK T as (pkT ,m, ρ), outputting (⊥,⊥) if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pkT ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1.
Compute d←R m; pd← Enc(pkT , d) and output (d, pd).
• Vote(d,PK T , nC , β, k). Parse PK T as a vector (pkT ,m, ρ), outputting ⊥ if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pkT ,m), ρ, k) 6=
1 ∨ β 6∈ {1, . . . , nC} ∨ {1, . . . , nC} 6⊆ m. Select coins r1 and r2, compute c1 ← Enc(pkT , β; r1); c2 ←
Enc(pkT , d; r2);σ ← ProveCiph((pkT , c1, {1, . . . , nC}), (β, r1), k); τ ← ProveBind((pkT , c1, c2), (β, r1, d, r2), k) and
output ballot (c1, c2, σ, τ).
• Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k). Initialize vectors X of length nC and P of length 9. Parse SK T as (pkT , skT ). Compute for
1 ≤ j ≤ nC do X[j]← 0. Proceed as follows.
1) Remove invalid ballots: Let {b1, . . . , b`} be the largest subset of BB such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` we have bi is a
vector of length 4 and VerCiph((pkT , bi[1], {1, . . . , nC}), bi[3], k) = 1 ∧ VerBind((pkT , bi[1], bi[2]), bi[4], k) = 1. If
{b1, . . . , b`} = ∅, then output (X,P).
2) Eliminating duplicates: Initialize Pdupl as a vector of length `. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ `, if there
exists σ and j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} such that σ ← ProvePET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 1), skT , k)
and VerPET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 1), σ, k) = 1, then assign Pdupl[i] ← (σ); otherwise, compute σj ←
ProvePET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 0), skT , k) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} and assign Pdupl[i] ←
(σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σ`). Let BB be the empty vector and compute for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` ∧ |Pdupl[i]| = ` − 1
do BB ← BB ‖ (bi), where BB ‖ (bi) denotes the concatenation of vectors BB and (bi)—i.e., BB ‖ (bi) =
(BB[1], . . . ,BB[|BB|], bi).
3) Mixing: Suppose BB = (b′1, . . . , b
′
|BB|). Select a random permutation χ on {1, . . . , |BB|}, initialize
C1, C2, r1 and r2 as vectors of length |BB|, and fill r1 and r2 with random coins. Com-
pute for 1 ≤ i ≤ |BB| do C1[χ(i)] ← b′i[1] ⊗ Enc(PK T , e; r1[i]); C2[χ(i)] ← b′i[2] ⊗
Enc(PK T , e; r2[i]) and Pmix,1 ← ProveMix((pkT , (b′1[1], . . . , b′|BB|[1]),C1), (r1, χ), k);Pmix,2 ←
ProveMix((pkT , (b
′
1[2], . . . , b
′
|BB|[2]),C2), (r2, χ), k). Similarly, select a random permutation χ
′ on {1, . . . , |L|},
initialize C3 and r3 as vectors of length |L|, fill r3 with random coins, and compute for 1 ≤ i ≤ |L| do
C3[χ
′(i)]← L[i]⊗ Enc(PK T , e; r3[i]) and Pmix,3 ← ProveMix((pkT , L), (r3, χ′), k).
4) Remove ineligible ballots: Initialize Pinelig as a vector of length |C2|. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ |C2|, if there exists σ
and c ∈ C3 such that σ ← ProvePET((pkT ,C2[i], c, 1), skT , k) and VerPET((pkT ,C2[i], c), σ, k) = 1, then assign
Pinelig[i]← (σ); otherwise, compute σj ← ProvePET((pkT ,C2[i],C3[j], 0), skT , k) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , |C3|} and
assign Pinelig[i]← (σ1, . . . , σ|C3|).
5) Decrypting: Initialize Pdec as the empty vector. Compute for 1 ≤ i ≤ |C1|∧|Pinelig[i]| = 1 do β ← Dec(skT ,C1[i]);
σ ← ProveDec(pkT ,C1[i], β), skT , k); X[β]← X[β] + 1; Pdec ← Pdec ‖ (σ).
Assign P← (Pdupl,C1, Pmix,1,C2, Pmix,2,C3, Pmix,3,Pinelig,Pdec) and output (X,P).
• Verify(PK T ,BB , L, nC ,X,P, k). Parse PK T as a vector (pkT ,m, ρ), X as a vector of length nC , and P as a vector
(Pdupl,C1, Pmix,1,C2, Pmix,2,C3, Pmix,3,Pinelig,Pdec), outputting 0 if parsing fails or VerKey((k, pkT ,m), ρ, k) 6= 1.
Let mC = |m|. If nC > mC , then output 0. Otherwise, perform the following checks:
1) Check removal of invalid ballots: Compute {b1, . . . , b`} as per Step (1) of the tallying algorithm. If {b1, . . . , b`} = ∅
and X is a zero-filled vector, then output 1. Otherwise, proceed as follows.
2) Check duplicate elimination: Check that Pdupl is a vector of length ` and that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `, either: i) |Pdupl[i]| = 1
and there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} such that VerPET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 1),Pdupl[i][1], k) = 1, or ii)
|Pdupl[i]| = `−1 and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} we have VerPET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 0),Pdupl[i][j], k) = 1.
3) Check mixing: Compute BB as per Step (2) of the tallying algorithm, suppose BB = (b′1, . . . , b
′
|BB|), and check
that VerMix((pkT , (b
′
1[1], . . . , b
′
|BB|[1]),C1), Pmix,1, k) = 1 ∧ VerMix((pkT , (b′1[2], . . . , b′|BB|[2]),C2), Pmix,2, k) =
1 ∧ VerMix((pkT , L,C3), Pmix,3, k) = 1.
4) Check removal of ineligible ballots: Check that Pinelig is a vector of length |C2| and that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |C2|,
either: i) |Pinelig[i]| = 1 and there exists c ∈ C3 such that VerPET((pkT ,C2[i], c, 1),Pinelig[i][1], k) = 1, or ii)
|Pinelig[i]| = |C3| and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |C3| we have VerPET((pkT ,C2[i],C3[j], 0),Pinelig[i][j], k) = 1.
5) Check decryption: Compute C′1 as follows: C
′
1 ← (); for 1 ≤ i ≤ |C1| ∧ |Pinelig[i]| = 1 do C′1 ← C′1 ‖ (C1[i]).
Check that there exists β1, . . . , β|C′1| such that X[i] = |{j : 1 ≤ j ≤ |C′1| ∧ βj = i}| and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |C′1| we have
VerDec((pkT ,C
′
1[i], βi),Pdec[i], k) = 1.
Output 0 if any of the above checks do not hold. Otherwise, if all the above checks succeed, output 1.
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since JCJ ensures that nB is bounded by a polynomial in k
and the secret keys are just random nonces. Now it is easy to
see that the only step of Tally that we need to be concerned
about is the step in which duplicate ballots are removed. This
is because the checks performed in the other steps all pass
with overwhelming probability when the computation is done
honestly. In the step to remove duplicate ballots, we need
to make sure that there are not multiple ballots computed
using skn+1. As we argued above, skn+1 is unique among
the secret keys, so the ballot computed using skn+1 will not
be removed, and we will get that X = Y. Therefore, JCJ
satisfies correctness.
Lemma 25. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5, Σ6 and H satisfy
the preconditions of Figure 3. We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,
Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies Completeness.
Proof. Let JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H) = (Setup,
Register,Vote,Tally,Verify), FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,
VerKey), FS(Σ4,H) = (ProveDec,VerDec), FS(Σ5,H) =
(ProvePET,VerPET), and FS(Σ6,H) = (ProveMix,VerMix).
Suppose k is a security parameter, BB is a bulletin board,
and nC is an integer. Further suppose (PK T ,SK T ) is
a key pair, mB and mC are integers, L is an electoral
roll (i.e., a set of public keys output by Register), and
(X, P ) is a tally, such that (PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC) ←
Setup(k) and (X, P ) ← Tally(SK T ,BB , L, nC , k). More-
over, suppose nC ≤ mC . By definition of Setup, there
exist coins r such that (pk , sk ,m) = Gen(k; r), PK T ←
(pk ,m, ρ), SK T ← (pk , sk) and mC = |m|, where
ρ is an output of ProveKey((k,PK T ,m), (SK T , r), k).
Since nC is at most |m|, we have that any β ∈
{1, . . . , nC} is in Γ’s message space. Moreover, by
the definition of Tally, vector X is of length nC
and P is a vector (Pdupl,C1, Pmix,1,C2, Pmix,2,C3,
Pmix,3,Pinelig,Pdec). It follows that Verify can parse
P and X successfully. Moreover, by completeness of
(ProveKey,VerKey), we have VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1
with overwhelming probability. Suppose {b1, . . . , bl} is the
largest subset of BB satisfying the conditions given by al-
gorithm Tally. If {b1, . . . , bl} = ∅, then X is a zero-filled
vector and Verify accepts, concluding our proof. Otherwise,
we proceed by showing that checks (2)–(5) of Verify succeed:
• Check duplicate elimination. The check succeeds by com-
pleteness of (ProvePET,VerPET), namely, for all 1 ≤
i ≤ ` we have either: i) |Pdupl[i]| = 1 and there exists
j ∈ {1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , `} such that VerPET((PK T ,
bi[2], bj [2], 1),Pdupl[i][1], k) = 1; or ii) |Pdupl[i]| =
`− 1 and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} we have
VerPET((PK T , bi[2], bj [2], 0)),Pdupl[i][j], k) = 1.
• Check mixing. Suppose BB = (b′1, . . . , b
′
|BB|). Then by
the completeness of (ProveMix,VerMix), we have that
VerMix((PK T , (b′1[1], . . . , b
′
|BB|[1]),C1), Pmix,1, k) =
1∧VerMix((PK T , (b′1[2], . . . , b′|BB|[2]),C2), Pmix,2, k) =
1 ∧ VerMix((PK T , L,C3), Pmix,3, k) = 1.
• Check removal of ineligible ballots. By Step (4) of Tally,
we have Pinelig is a vector of length |C2|. Moreover,
by completeness of (ProvePET,VerPET), for all 1 ≤
i ≤ |C2| we have either: i) |Pinelig[i]| = 1 and there
exists c ∈ C3 such that VerPET((PK T ,C2[i], c, 1),
Pinelig[i][1], k) = 1; or ii) |Pinelig[i]| = |C3| and for all
1 ≤ j ≤ |C3| we have VerPET((PK T ,C2[i],C3[j], 0),
Pinelig[i][j], k) = 1. It follows that the check succeeds.
• Check decryption. Verify computes the set C′1 such
that it includes only elements ci of C1 for which
|Pinelig[i]| = 1. Then, by the definition of Tally and
the completeness of (ProveDec,VerDec), we have that
VerDec((PK T ,C′1[i], βi),P[9][i], k) = 1 for all 1 ≤
i ≤ |C′1|. Furthermore, in step 5 of Tally, ballots
C1[i] are only counted for a candidate when 1 ≤ i ≤
|C1| ∧ |Pinelig[i]| = 1, which is exactly how C′1 is
defined. Therefore, there exists β1, . . . β|C′1| such that
X[i] = |{j : 1 ≤ j ≤ |C′1| ∧ βj = i}|.
It follows that all the required checks succeed and Verify
outputs 1, concluding our proof.
Lemma 26. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5, Σ6 and H
satisfy the preconditions of Figure 3. Further suppose Γ
is collision-free. We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H)
satisfies Injectivity.
The proof of Lemma 26 is similar to the proof of Lemma 17.
Proof sketch. Generalized JCJ ballots contain encrypted
choices, hence, collision-freeness of the encryption scheme
ensures that distinct choices are not mapped to the same
ballot.
Generalized JCJ can be instantiate to derive JCJ:
Definition 29 (JCJ). JCJ [83] is JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,
Σ6,H), where Γ is a modified version of El Gamal [58]
invented by Juels et al. [83, §4] that can be seen as a sim-
plified version of Cramer–Shoup [49], Σ1 is the proof of key
construction by Gennaro et al. [62], Σ4 is the conjunction [46]
of two Schnorr proofs [109], Σ5 is the PET by MacKenzie et
al. [96], Σ6 is either the mixnet of Furukawa and Sako [61]
or Neff [99], and H is a random oracle. Juels et al. leave Σ2
and Σ3 unspecified.
Juels et al. [83] do not mandate particular cryptographic prim-
itives, so Definition 29 might be seen more as an instantiation
of their scheme than an exact recollection of it. We assume that
the primitives in Definition 29 satisfy the properties required
by generalized JCJ. We also assume that the sigma protocols
satisfy special soundness and special honest verifier zero-
knowledge, hence, Theorem 12 is applicable.
To show that JCJ is an election scheme, we must demon-
strate that Correctness, Completeness and Injectivity are sat-
isfied. Correctness follows immediately from Lemma 24 and
Completeness follows from Lemma 25. We show that Injec-
tivity is also satisfied.
A non-interactive proof system derived from a sigma proto-
col for proving correct key construction is sufficient to ensure
that El Gamal is collision-free:
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Lemma 27. Suppose Σ1 is a sigma protocol that proves
correct key construction and H is a hash function. Let FS(Σ1,
H) = (ProveKey,VerKey). Further suppose for all security
parameters k, public keys pk , message spaces m and proofs
ρ, we have VerKey((k, pk ,m), ρ, k) = 1 implies h 6= 0, there
exists p, q, g and h such that pk = (p, q, g, h) and (p, q, g) are
cryptographic parameters, and m = {1, . . . , p− 1}. It follows
that multiplicatively homomorphic El Gamal is collision-free
for m1,m2 ∈ m.
The proof of Lemma 27 is similar to the proof of Lemma 19.
Proof. Suppose k is a security parameter, pk is a public
key, m is a message space, ρ is a proof, m1,m2 ∈ m are
messages and r1 and r2 are coins such that VerKey((k, pk ,
m), ρ, k) = 1, m1 6= m2 ∨ r1 6= r2, m = {1, . . . , p − 1},
and pk = (p, q, g, h) for some p, q, g and h. Further suppose
that c1 and c2 are ciphertexts such that c1 = Enc(pk ,m1; r1),
c2 = Enc(pk ,m2; r2), and Enc is El Gamal’s encryption
algorithm. If r1 6= r2, then we proceed as follows. By def-
inition of Enc, we have c1[1] = gr1 (mod p) and c2[1] = gr2
(mod p). Since r1 and r2 are distinct, we have gr1 6≡ gr2
(mod p). (We implicitly assume that coins r1 and r2 are
selected from the coin space Z∗q , hence, gr1 = gr1 mod p
and gr2 = gr2 mod p.) It follows that c1 6= c2. Otherwise
(r1 = r2), we have m1 6= m2 and we proceed as follows.
By definition of Enc, we have c1[2] = hr1 · m1 (mod p)
and c2[2] = hr2 · m2 (mod p). Since h 6= 0, we have
hr1 ·m1 6≡ hr1 ·m2 (mod p).
Given that ciphertexts generated by the modified version of El
Gamal used in JCJ [83, §4] encapsulate El Gamal ciphertexts,
the proof of key construction by Gennaro et al. [62] is
sufficient to ensure that El Gamal is collision-free:
Corollary 28. The modified version of El Gamal used in
JCJ [83, §4] is collision-free its message space m.
The sigma protocol for proving correct key construction by
Gennaro et al. [62] does not explicitly require the suitability
of cryptographic parameters to be checked, hence, Lemma 27
is not immediately applicable. Nonetheless, we can trivially
make the necessary checks explicit and, hence, the non-
interactive proof system derived from the sigma protocol for
proving correct key construction by Gennaro et al. is sufficient
to ensure that El Gamal is collision-free. It follows that JCJ
satisfies Injectivity, hence, JCJ is an election scheme.
APPENDIX I
PROOF: JCJ IS VERIFIABLE
Elections schemes constructed from generalized JCJ sat-
isfy individual (§I-A), universal (§I-B) and eligibility (§I-C)
verifiability, hence, such schemes satisfy election verifiability
with internal authentication (§I-D). It follows that JCJ satisfies
election verifiability (§I-E).
A. Individual verifiability
Proposition 29. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5, Σ6 and H
satisfy the preconditions of Figure 3. Further suppose that
Γ is collision-free for its message space m and Σ1 satisfies
special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies individual
verifiability.
Proof. Let JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H)=(Setup,Vote,
Tally,Verify) and FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey). Sup-
pose k is a security parameter, PK T is a public key, nC
is an integer, and β and β′ are choices. Further suppose
that (pk , sk) and (pk ′, sk ′) are key pairs and b and b′ are
ballots such that (pk , sk) ← Register(PK T , k), (pk ′, sk ′) ←
Register(PK T , k), b ← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k), b′ ←
Vote(sk ′,PK T , nC , β′, k), b 6= ⊥, and b′ 6= ⊥. By defi-
nition of Vote, we have PK T is a vector (pkT ,m, ρ) and
VerKey((k, pkT ,m), ρ, k) = 1. By definition of Vote, b[2]
and b′[2] are ciphertexts such that b[2] ← Enc(pkT , sk) and
b′[2] ← Enc(pkT , sk ′), where sk , sk ′ ∈ m. Furthermore, the
ciphertexts are constructed using random coins—i.e., the coins
used by b[2] and b′[2] will be distinct with overwhelming prob-
ability. Since Γ is collision-free for m, we have b[2] 6= b′[2]
and b 6= b′ with overwhelming probability, concluding our
proof.
B. Universal verifiability.
Proposition 30. Suppose Γ is a homomorphic asymmet-
ric encryption scheme, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5 and Σ6, are
sigma protocols and H is a hash function such that the
conditions of Figure 3 are satisfied. Further suppose that
Γ satisfies IND-CPA and Σ1 and Σ6 satisfy special sound-
ness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge. We have
JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies universal verifia-
bility.
The proof is similar in structure to the universal verifiability
proof for Helios (§F-B): we use the definition of the verifica-
tion algorithm to construct the tally X given by the adversary,
and then show that X is equal to the correct tally.
Proof. Suppose that an execution of Exp-UV-Int(Π,A, k)
computes
(PK T , nV )← A(k);
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(PK T , k)
L← {pk1, . . . , pknV };
M ← {(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pknV , sknV )};
(BB , nC ,X, P )← A(M);
Y ← correct-tally(PK T ,BB ,M, nC , k);
such that Verify(PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P, k) = 1. The JCJ verifi-
cation algorithm checks the proof ρ in PK T = (pkT ,m, ρ),
so VerKey((k, pkT ,m), ρ, k) = 1 and by simulation sound ex-
tractability we are assured that pkT was honestly generated—
i.e., there exists r and SK T such that (pkT ,SK T ,m) =
Gen(k; r). We now look at each step in the Verify algorithm.
• Check removal of invalid ballots: Let {b1, . . . , b`} be
the largest subset of BB such that for all 1 ≤
i ≤ ` we have bi is a vector of length 4
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and VerCiph((pkT , bi[1]{1, . . . , nC}), bi[3], k) = 1 ∧
VerBind((pkT , bi[1], bi[2]), bi[4], k) = 1. If this set is
empty, then Verify would only accept if X[i] = 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ nC and P = ⊥. Since the set is
empty, no ballots b were posted to the bulletin board
for which VerCiph((pkT , bi[1], {1, . . . , nC}), bi[3], k) =
1 ∧ VerBind((pkT , bi[1], bi[2]), bi[4], k) = 1. By the
completeness of the non-interactive proof system, if the
ballots were outputs of the Vote function, then they would
verify. Therefore, no ballots on the bulletin board were
the output of the Vote function, so we will have that
Y is also a vector of zeroes. Thus we would have that
X = Y and conclude our proof. Now let’s assume that
{b1, . . . , b`} 6= ∅.
We must have for all choices β ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, secret
keys sk such that (pk , sk) ∈M , coins r, and ballots b =
Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k; r) that b 6∈ BB\{b1, . . . , b`}
with overwhelming probability, since otherwise we would
have a contradiction: {b1, . . . , b`} is not the largest subset
of BB satisfying the conditions of the Tally algorithm.
Therefore, we must have that
correct-tally(PK T ,M,BB , nC , k)
= correct-tally(PK T ,M, {b1, . . . , b`}, nC , k) (5)
• Check duplicate elimination: Next, the verification
algorithm checks that duplicate votes were
properly eliminated—i.e., that either |Pdupl[i]| =
1 ∧ ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , `} such that
VerPET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2]),Pdupl[i][1], 1, k) = 1 or
|Pdupl[i]| = ` − 1 ∧ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . ,
n} such that VerPET((pkT , bi[2], bj [2], 0),
Pdupl[i][j], k) = 1. Let BB be constructed as in
Step (2) of the JCJ tallying algorithm. By the simulation
sound extractability of the Pdupl[i], we are assured that
there are no duplicate votes in BB.
• Check mixing: Now the ballots in BB are permuted
and re-encrypted using a mixnet. While permuting the
ballots isn’t necessary for verifiability, the associated
proofs are necessary because they show that the
re-encryption was done properly (for example, they
ensure that the encrypted ballot was multiplied by
an encryption of the identity element, and not some
other group element that might change the vote).
Let C1 denote the list of mixed re-encryptions of
candidates, C2 denote the list of mixed re-encryptions
of voters’ secret keys from the ballots, and C3 denote
the mixed list of encryptions of voters’ secret keys. The
permutation used to generate C3 is different from the
permutation used to generate C1 and C2, but this isn’t
important to the verifiability of the scheme. We have that
VerMix((pkT , (b
′
1[1], . . . , b
′
|BB|[1]),C1), Pmix,1, k) =
1∧VerMix((pkT , (b′1[2], . . . , b′|BB|[2]),C2), Pmix,2, k) =
1 ∧ VerMix((pkT , L,C3), Pmix,3, k) = 1. By simulation
sound extractability, we have that each Ci does indeed
contain re-encryptions of the original lists in BB.
• Check removal of ineligible ballots: Next, the veri-
fication algorithm ensures that ineligible ballots are
removed properly. The verification algorithm checks
that each PET in P[8] = Pinelig is valid. Let
C ′1 ⊆ C1 be the set of C1[i] ∈ C1 for which
|Pinelig| = 1 and there exists c ∈ C3 such that
VerPET((pkT ,C2[i], c, 1),Pinelig[i][1], k) = 1. In other
words, C ′1 is the set of encryptions of candidates gener-
ated using a valid voter’s secret key.
• Check decryption: Finally, the verification algorithm
checks the proofs that all of the ballots in C ′1 are properly
decrypted. The verification algorithm outputs 1, so by
simulation sound extractability we are assured that the
multiset of candidates given by decrypting the ballots
in C ′1 is correct. We will call this multiset CFinal .
Finally the verification algorithm checks that this multiset
corresponds to the vector X.
We can see that CFinal satisfies the following properties.
First, every element β in CFinal corresponds to a ballot
b ∈ BB which was generated using Vote with a valid voter’s
secret key. This is ensured by steps (1), (3), and (4) of the
verification algorithm. Second, for every β ∈ CFinal , the ballot
corresponding to this β was the only one constructed under its
particular secret key—i.e., ¬∃b′, β′, r′ : b′ ∈ BB \ {b} ∧ b′ =
Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β′, k; r′)}, where b is the ballot corre-
sponding to β. This is ensured by steps (2) and (3) of the ver-
ification algorithm. Therefore, we have that each β ∈ CFinal
corresponds to a ballot in authorized(PK T ,BB ,M, nC , k).
Finally X[β] = k iff ∃=kβ ∈ CFinal . This is ensured by step
(5) of the verification algorithm. Since these are the exact prop-
erties that define correct-tally(PK T ,M, {b1, . . . , b`}, nC , k),
we must have that X = Y.
C. Eligibility Verifiability
We proceed as follows. First, we derive an IND-1-
CPA encryption scheme from generalized JCJ (§I-C1). Sec-
ondly, we introduce an experiment that is equivalent to
Exp-EV-Int-Weak for JCJ (§I-C2). Finally, we prove that JCJ
satisfies our new experiment (§I-C3), using the IND-1-CPA
encryption scheme.
1) Encryption scheme from generalized JCJ:
Definition 30. Suppose Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is an asym-
metric encryption scheme, Σ1 proves correct key construc-
tion, Σ3 proves conjunctive plaintext knowledge, and H is
a random oracle. Let FS(Σ1,H) = (ProveKey,VerKey) and
FS(Σ3,H) = (ProveBind,VerBind). We define ΠJCJ (Π,Σ1,
Σ3,H) = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) as follows:
• Gen′(k; r) : Compute (pkT , skT ,m) ← Gen(k; r);
ρ ← ProveKey((k,PK T ,m), (SK T , r), k); PK T ←
(pkT ,m, ρ); SK T ← ((PK T , k), skT );m′ ←
{(m1,m2) | m1,m2 ∈ m}. Output ((PK T , k),
SK T ,m′).
• Enc′(pk ,m) : Parse m as a vector (β, d), pk as a
vector (PK T , k), and PK T as a vector (pkT ,m, ρ),
outputting ⊥ if parsing fails. Select coins r1 and r2 and
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compute c1 ← Enc(pkT , β; r1); c2 ← Enc(pkT , d; r2);
τ ← ProveBind((pkT , c1, c2), (β, r1, d, r2), k). Output
(c1, c2, τ).
• Dec′(SK T , c) : Parse c as (c1, c2, τ), SK T as (pk , sk),
pk as (PK T , k), and PK T as (pkT ,m, ρ), outputting
⊥ if parsing fails or VerBind((pkT , c1, c2), τ, k) 6= 1.
Compute β ← Dec(sk , c1); d ← Dec(sk , c2) and output
(β, d).
The key generation algorithm Gen′ outputs a public key
(PK T , k), where PK T = (pkT ,m, ρ). Parameters m, ρ, and
k are used in our proof of eligibility verifiability, but are not
required by the encryption scheme.
Proposition 31. ΠJCJ (Π,Σ1,Σ3,H) is an asymmetric en-
cryption scheme satisfying IND-1-CPA, where Π, Σ1, Σ3 and
H satisfy the preconditions of Definition 30.
Proof. The proof that this scheme satisfies IND-1-CPA is
adapted from that of [22, Theorem 5.1]. We will show that
if there is an adversary A′ that can win the IND-1-CPA
game for the scheme, then there is another adversary A that
can win the IND-CPA game for the following scheme: Let
Γ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an asymmetric encryption scheme
satisfying IND-CPA. Define Γ′ = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) as fol-
lows:
• Gen′(k; r) : Compute (pk , sk ,m) ← Gen(k; r); ρ ←
ProveKey((k, pk ,m), (sk , r), k); PK T ← (pk ,m, ρ);
pk ′ = (PK T , k); SK T ← (pk ′, sk); m′ ← {(m1,m2) |
m1,m2 ∈ m}, and output (pk ′,SK T ,m′).
• Enc′(pk,m) : Parse m as a vector (m0,m1), pk as
(PK T , k), and PK T as (pk ′,m, ρ), outputting ⊥ if
parsing fails. Compute c0 ← Enc(pk ′,m0); c1 ←
Enc(pk ′,m1), and output (c0, c1).
• Dec′(sk , c) : Parse c as a vector (c0, c1), pk as (PK T , k),
and PK T as (pk ′,m, ρ), outputting ⊥ if parsing fails.
Compute m0 ← Dec(sk , c0); m1 ← Dec(sk , c1), and
output (m0,m1).
It is straightforward to see that this scheme satisfies IND-CPA.
Now we begin the reduction. Let A′ be an adversary that
wins the IND-1-CPA game against ΠJCJ (Π,Σ1,Σ3,H) with
non-negligible probability. We will construct an adversary A
that wins the IND-CPA game against the Γ′ defined above with
non-negligible probability. A is first given a public key pk ,
where pk = (PK T , k) and PK T = (pk ′,m, ρ). A forwards
pk to A′. A′ may make queries to its random oracle. A
will simulate the random oracle and keep a list H of all
previously asked queries. If A′ makes a query for a value
already in H, A responds with a value consistent with the
list. If A′ makes a query for a new value, A chooses a value
uniformly at random from the range of the random oracle and
adds the query/response pair to H. We will denote by H(x)
the response y such that (x, y) is in H, and ⊥ if no such
query/response pair is in H.
Next A′ will output two messages m0,m1 of the form
(β, d). A outputs m0,m1 and receives a challenge ciphertext
c∗ = (c∗0, c
∗
1). A then picks a challenge chal∗ at random
from the challenge space. In order to generate the proof of
conjunctive plaintext knowledge that A′ expects, A will use
the simulator Sim for the sigma protocol associated with
ProveBind. This simulator exists due to the special honest
verifier zero-knowledge property of the sigma protocol. A runs
Sim((pk ′, c∗0, c
∗
1), chal
∗) to obtain the simulated proof τ∗ =
(comm∗, resp∗), and adds the pair ((pk ′, c∗0, c
∗
1)||comm∗,
chal∗) to H. If there is already an entry corresponding to the
query (pk ′, c∗0, c
∗
1)||comm∗ in H, A aborts with “Error 1”. A
then gives (c∗0, c
∗
1, τ
∗) to A′.
A′ will next output its vector of decryption queries c. Let
|c| = `. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, A will obtain the response to
the query c[i] using the following procedure. First, A checks
that c[i] is a valid ciphertext, i.e, that c[i] = (c0i , c
1
i , τi) where
τi = (commi , respi) such that VerBind((pk ′, c0i , c
1
i ), (commi ,
H((pk ′, c0i , c1i )||commi)), respi , k) = 1. If there is no entry
(x, y) ∈ H such that x = (pk ′, c0i , c1i )||commi , A adds it as
if A′ had queried its random oracle on that value. If these
conditions do not hold or c[i] = (c∗0, c
∗
1, τ
∗), the response
for c[i] will be ⊥. Now A checks to see where A′ queried on
(pk ′, c0i , c
1
i )||commi . If A′ never made such a query, A aborts
with “Error 2”. A simulates a new copy of A′ up to the point
of that query, but this time responds with a new, uniformly
random value. All other queries are answered as they were
in the “main” run of A′. A continues the simulation until
A′ outputs c′. If c′ contains an entry (c0j , c1j , τj) such that
c0j = c
0
i , c
1
j = c
1
i and commj = commi , then A uses the
special soundness extractor for the sigma protocol to obtain
the witness wi for the statement. This witness consists of the
messages and random coins used to generate the ciphertexts.
A uses this witness to answer the decryption query in the
“main” run. Finally, A′, will output a bit b, which A outputs
as well.
The remainder of the proof is almost exactly the same as
that of [22, Theorem 5.1], and so is omitted here.
2) Variant of Exp-EV-Int-Weak:
Exp-EV-1-Int(Π,A, k) =
(PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC)← Setup(k);1
(pk , sk)← Register(PK T , k);2
Rvld ← ∅;3
(nC , β, b)← AR(PK T , pk , k);4
if ∃r : b = Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k; r) ∧ b 6= ⊥5
∧ b 6∈ Rvld then
return 16
else7
return 08
Lemma 32. Let Π be Generalized JCJ, where the encryption
scheme Γ satisfies IND-CPA. Then we have
∀A ∃µ ∀k . Succ(Exp-EV-1-Int(Π,A, k)) ≤ µ(k)
⇔ ∀A′ ∃µ′ ∀k′ . Succ(Exp-EV-Int-Weak(Π,A′, k′)) ≤ µ′(k′),
where A and A′ are PPT adversaries, µ and µ′ are negligible
functions, and k and k′ are security parameters.
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The forward implication is required by Proposition 33 and
we provide a formal proof below. A proof of the reverse
implication is straight-forward and we omit our formal proof.
Proof. We will show that if an adversary wins
Exp-EV-Int-Weak, then there exists an adversary that
wins Exp-EV-1-Int. Let A′ be the adversary that wins
Exp-EV-Int-Weak with non-negligible probability. We will
construct the adversary A for Exp-EV-1-Int. The challenger
first computes (PK T ,SK T ,mB ,mC) ← Setup(k) and (pk ,
sk) ← Register(PK T , k). A is given as input (PK T , pk , k)
and forwards (PK T , k) to A′. A′ outputs nV .
Now A′ may make some oracle queries. A will maintain
a list H of (i, pk ′i, sk
′
i) tuples. A′’s first oracle, C, needs to
return secret keys associated with the pk i. When A receives
a query C(i), A checks if (i, pk ′i, sk ′i) ∈ H . If so, A returns
sk ′i. Otherwise, A computes (pk ′i, sk ′i)← Register(PK T , k),
adds (i, pk ′i, sk
′
i) to H , and returns sk
′
i. Again by the IND-
CPA property of the encryption scheme, A′ cannot tell that
sk ′i does not actually correspond to pk i. A′’s second or-
acle, R can be queried on inputs (i, β, nC), on which it
returns Vote(ski,PK T , nC , β, k). If A receives the query
R(i, β, nC), it checks if (i, pk ′i, sk
′
i) ∈ H . If so, A computes
b = Vote(sk′i,PK T , Q, nC , β, k) and returns b. Otherwise, A
computes (pk ′i, sk
′
i) ← Register(PK T , k), adds (i, pk ′i, sk ′i)
to H , then computes b = Vote(sk′i,PK T , nC , β, k) and
returns b. Again by the IND-CPA property of the encryption
scheme, A′ cannot tell that the ballots b he receives were
computed with a secret key that does not correspond to pk i.
Finally, A′ outputs (nC , β, i, b), and A outputs (nC , β, b).
Clearly, A has the same success probability as A′, so A wins
Exp-EV-1-Int with non-negligible probability.
3) Eligibility Verifiability:
Proposition 33. Suppose Γ is a homomorphic asymmetric
encryption scheme, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5 and Σ6, are sigma
protocols and H is a hash function such that the conditions of
Figure 3 are satisfied. Further suppose that Γ satisfies IND-
CPA. We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies eli-
gibility verifiability.
Proof. Let ΠJCJ = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) be defined as above.
Let A′ be an adversary that wins the Exp-EV-1-Int game. We
will construct the adversary A that wins the IND-1-CPA game
with non-negligible advantage. The challenger first generates
(PK ,SK T ,m) ← Gen′(k), where PK = (PK T , k) and
PK T = (pkT ,m, ρ), and gives (PK T , k) to A as input.
A runs Register(PK T , k) twice to get (pk0, sk0), (pk1, sk1)
and sets m0 = (1, sk0),m1 = (1, sk1). A then outputs
(m0,m1). The challenger picks a bit b at random and gives
c = Enc′(PK ,mb) to A. We have c = (c1, c2, τ), where
c2 = Enc(pkT , skb). Now A begins to interact with A′ by
giving (PK T , c2, k) to A′.
At this point A′ may call its oracle R. If A receives a query
R(β, nC), it will construct x ← Vote(sk0,PK T , nC , β, k)
and return x. We have that x = (Enc(pkT , β),Enc(pkT , sk0),
σ, τ), where σ and τ are proofs of plaintext knowledge in
a subspace and conjunctive plaintext knowledge, respectively.
By the IND-CPA property of Enc, A′ can’t distinguish be-
tween encryptions of sk0 and sk1. Therefore we can construct
x using sk0 even if the secret key corresponding to c2 is
actually sk1.
A′ will then output (nC , β, b∗), where b∗ = (c∗1, c∗2, σ∗, τ∗).
A′ wins with probability 1p(k) for some polynomial
function p, so with probability 1p(k) we have that
c1 = Enc(pkT , β; r1), c2 = Enc(pkT , skb; r2),
σ = ProveCiph((pkT , c1, {1, . . . , nC}), (β, r1), k), and
τ∗ = ProveBind((pkT , c1, c2), (β, r1, skb, r2), k). In order to
ensure that we get a ballot of this form from A′ with high
enough probability, A repeats the above interaction with A′
p(k) times to obtain (n1C , β
1, b∗1), . . . , (n
p(k)
C , β
p(k), b∗p(k)).
A outputs (b∗1[1], b∗1[2], b∗1[4]), . . . , (b∗p(k)[1], b∗p(k)[2], b∗p(k)[4]),
and receives Dec′(SK T , (b∗1[1], b
∗
1[2], b
∗
1[4])), . . . ,
Dec′(SK T , (b∗p(k), b
∗
p(k)[2], b
∗
p(k)[4])). If there exist i, j
such that Dec′(SK T , (b∗i [1], b
∗
i [2], b
∗
i [4])) = (β
i, sk0) and
Dec′(SK T , (b∗j [1], b
∗
j [2], b
∗
j [4])) = (β
j , sk1), or there exists
no i such that Dec′(SK T , (b∗i [1], b
∗
i [2], b
∗
i [4])) = (β
∗, sk0) or
(β∗, sk1), then A outputs a random bit. Otherwise, if there
exists i such that Dec′(SK T , (b∗i [1], b
∗
i [2], b
∗
i [4])) = (β
∗, sk0),
then A outputs 0. Likewise, if there exists i such that
Dec′(SK T , (b∗i [1], b
∗
i [2], b
∗
i [4])) = (β
∗, sk1), then A outputs
1.
We now argue that A can determine the correct bit b with
non-negligible advantage.
There are three possible events that can occur in a run of A.
The first possibility is that A′ fails on each of its p(k) runs so
that A has to guess. This occurs with probability (1− 1p(k) )p(k).
The second event is that A′ does succeed in one of its runs,
but on a different run it outputs
b = (Enc(PK T , β; r1),
Enc(PK T , sk(1−b); r2),
ProveCiph((PK T , c1, {1, . . . , nC}), (β, r1), k),
ProveBind((PK T , c1, c2), (β, r1, sk (1−b), r2), k)).
However, because sk0 and sk1 are chosen randomly, the
probability of this occurring is negligible. Finally, the third
possibility is that A′ succeeds in at least one of its runs. This
occurs with probability
∑p(k)−1
i=0 (1− 1p(k) )i( 1p(k) ). In the first
two events, A guesses and wins with probability 12 , and in
the third event A wins with probability 1. Therefore, the total
probability that A wins is (∑p(k)−1i=0 (1− 1p(k) )i( 1p(k) ))+ 12 (1−
1
p(k) )
p(k) + 12µ(k), for some negligible function µ.
We have that this equation is equal to:
= 1p(k)
∑p(k)−1
i=0 (1− 1p(k) )i + 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k)
+ 12µ(k)
= 1p(k) (p(k)− (1− 1p(k) )p(k)p(k)) + 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k)
+ 12µ(k)
= 1− (1− 1p(k) )p(k) + 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k) + 12µ(k)
= 1− 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k) + 12µ(k)
In order to determine the advantage of this adversary, we
subtract 12 from this:
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1− 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k) + 12µ(k)− 12
= 12 − 12 (1− 1p(k) )p(k) + 12µ(k)
As k gets large, (1 − 1p(k) )p(k) converges to 1e and µ(k)
goes to 0, so the entire equation converges to 12 − 12e . This is
non-negligible.
Combining this reduction with Lemma 32, we have
that if ΠJCJ satisfies IND-1-CPA, then JCJ satisfies
Exp-EV-Int-Weak.
D. Election verifiability
By Propositions 29, 30, & 33, election schemes constructed
from generalized JCJ satisfy election verifiability with internal
authentication:
Corollary 34. Suppose Γ, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, Σ5, Σ6 and H
satisfy the preconditions of Figure 3. Further suppose that
Γ satisfies IND-CPA and is collision-free, Σ1 and Σ6 satisfy
special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge,
and H is a random oracle. We have JCJ(Γ,Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4,
Σ5,Σ6,H) satisfies election verifiability with internal authen-
tication.
E. Proof: Theorem 8
Proof of Theorem 8. We know that Γ satisfies IND-CPA, and
by Corollary 28 Γ is also collision-free. Therefore the proof
follows from Corollary 34, subject to the applicability of
Theorem 12 to the mixnet and sigma protocol used by JCJ
to prove correct key construction.
APPENDIX J
JUELS ET AL. DEFINITIONS
Juels et al. [83, §2] define an election scheme as a tuple of
(Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) PPT algorithms:
• Register, denoted (pk , sk) ← Register(SKR, i, k1), is
executed by the registrars. Register takes as input the
private key SKR of the registrars, a voter’s identity i,
and security parameter k1. It outputs a credential pair
(pk , sk).
• Vote, denoted b ← Vote(sk ,PK T , nC , β, k2), is exe-
cuted by voters. Vote takes as input a voter’s private
credential sk , the public key PK T of the tallier, the
number of candidates nC , the voter’s choice β, and
security parameter k2. It outputs a ballot b.
• Tally, denoted (X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1,
k3), is executed by the tallier. Tally takes as input the
private key SK T of the tallier, the bulletin board BB ,
the number of candidates nC , the set containing voters’
public credentials, and security parameter k3. It outputs
the tally X and a proof P that the tally is correct.
• Verify, denoted v ← Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X,
P ), can be executed by anyone to audit the election.
Verify takes as input the public key PKR of the registrars,
the public key PK T of the tallier, the bulletin board BB ,
the number of candidates nC , and a candidate proof P
of correct tallying. It outputs a bit v, which is 1 if the
tally successfully verifies and 0 on failure.
The above definition fixes an apparent oversight in JCJ’s
presentation: we supply the registrars’ public key as input to
the verification algorithm, because that key would be required
by Verify to check the signature on the electoral roll.
Juels et al. [83, §3] formalize correctness and verifiability to
capture their notion of election verifiability. We rename those
to JCJ-correctness and JCJ-verifiability to avoid ambiguity.
For readability, the definitions we give below contain subtle
differences from the original presentation. For example, we
sometimes use for loops instead of pattern matching.
JCJ-correctness asserts that an adversary cannot modify
or eliminate votes of honest voters, and stipulates that at
most one ballot is tallied per voter. Intuitively, the security
definition challenges the adversary to ensure that verification
succeeds and the tally49 does not include some honest votes
or contains too many votes. The definition of JCJ-correctness
fixes apparent errors in the original presentation: the adversary
is given the credentials for corrupt voters and distinct security
parameters are supplied to the Register and Vote algorithms.
An implicit assumption is also omitted: {βi}i∈V\V′ is a
multiset of valid votes, that is, for all β ∈ {βi}i∈V\V′ we have
1 ≤ β ≤ nC . Without this assumption the security definition
cannot be satisfied by many election schemes, including the
election scheme by Juels et al.
Definition 31 (JCJ-correctness). An election scheme Π =
(Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) satisfies JCJ-correctness if for
all PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function µ,
such that for all positive integers nC and nV , and security
parameters k1, k2, and k3, we have Succ(Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A,
nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) ≤ µ(k1, k2, k3), where Exp-JCJ-Cor is
defined as follows:50
Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) =
V ← {1, . . . , nV };1
for i ∈ V do (pk i, sk i)← Register(SKR, i, k1)2
V ′ ← A({pk i}nVi=1);3
for i ∈ V \ V ′ do βi ← A();4
BB ← {Vote(sk i,PK T , nC , βi, k2)}i∈V\V′ ;5
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3);6
BB ← BB ∪ A(BB , {(pk i, sk i)}i∈V∩V′);7
(X′, P ′)← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3);8
if Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X′, P ′) = 19
∧ ({βi}i∈V\V′ 6⊆ 〈X′〉 ∨ |〈X′〉| − |〈X〉| > |V ′|) then
return 110
else11
return 012
The JCJ-correctness definition implicitly assumes that the
tally and associated proof are honestly computed using
49. Juels et al. translate tallies X into a multisets 〈X〉 representing the tally
as follows: 〈X〉 = ⋃1≤j≤|X|{ j, . . . , j︸ ︷︷ ︸
X[j] times
}.
50. We write µ(k1, k2, k3) for the smallest value in {µ(k1), µ(k2), µ(k3)}
(cf. [83, pp45]).
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the Tally algorithm. By comparison, the definition of JCJ-
verifiability (Definition 32) does not use this assumption,
hence, JCJ-verifiability is intended to assert that voters and
auditors can check whether votes have been recorded and tal-
lied correctly. Intuitively, the adversary is assumed to control
the tallier and voters, and the security definition challenges
the adversary to concoct an election (that is, the adversary
generates a bulletin board BB , a tally X, and a proof of
tallying P ) such that verification succeeds and tally X differs
tally X′ derived from honestly tallying the bulletin board BB .
It follows that there is at most one verifiable tally that can be
derived.
Definition 32 (JCJ-verifiability). An election scheme Π =
(Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) satisfies JCJ-verifiability if for
all PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function µ,
such that for all positive integers nC and nV , and security
parameters k1 and k3, we have Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Π,A,
nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) ≤ µ(k1, k2, k3), where Exp-JCJ-Ver is
defined as follows:
Exp-JCJ-Ver(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) =
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(SKR, i, k1)1
(BB ,X, P )← A(SK T , {(pk i, sk i)}nVi=1);2
(X′, P ′)← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3);3
if Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P ) = 1 ∧ X 6= X′4
then
return 15
else6
return 07
APPENDIX K
PROOFS: JUELS ET AL. ADMIT ATTACKS
This appendix contains proofs demonstrating that the def-
inition of election verifiability by Juels et al. [83] admits
collusion and biasing attacks (§VII). We have reported these
findings to the original authors.51,52
A. Proof: Proposition 9
Suppose Π = (Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) is an elec-
tion scheme satisfying JCJ-correctness and JCJ-verifiability.
Further suppose Stuff(Π, β, κ) = (Register,Vote,TallyS ,
VerifyS), for some integers β, κ ∈ N. We prove that
Stuff(Π, β, κ) satisfies JCJ-correctness and JCJ-verifiability.
We show that Stuff(Π, β, κ) satisfies JCJ-correctness by
contradiction. Suppose Succ(Exp-JCJ-Cor(Stuff(Π, β, κ),A,
nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) is non-negligible for some k1, k2, k3, nC ,
nV , and A. Hence, there exists an execution of the experiment
Exp-JCJ-Cor(Stuff(Π, β, κ),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)
that satisfies
VerifyS(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X
′, P ′) = 1
∧ ({βi}i∈V\V′ 6⊂ 〈X′〉 ∨ |〈X′〉| − |〈X〉| > |V ′|)
with non-negligible probability, where {βi}i∈V\V′ is the set
of honest votes, (X, P ) is the tally of honest votes, (X′, P ′)
is the tally of all votes, V ′ is a set of corrupt voter identities,
and BB is the bulletin board. Further suppose BB0 is the
bulletin board BB before adding stuffed ballots. By definition
of TallyS , there exist computations
(Y, Q)← Tally(SK T ,BB0, nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3)
and
(Y′, Q′)← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3)
such that X = Add(Y, β, κ), X′ = Add(Y′, β, κ), and P ′ =
Q′. Since κ ∈ N, we have 〈Y′〉 ⊆ 〈X′〉. Moreover, |〈X〉| =
|〈Y〉|+ κ and |〈X′〉| = |〈Y′〉|+ κ, hence,
|〈Y′〉| − |〈Y〉| = |〈X′〉| − |〈X〉|.
By definition of VerifyS and since Y
′ = Sub(X′, β, κ), there
exists a computation
v ← Verify0(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,Y′, Q′)
such that v = 1. It follows that
Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,Y′, Q′) = 1
∧ ({βi}i∈V\V′ 6⊂ 〈Y′〉 ∨ |〈Y′〉| − |〈Y〉| > |V ′|)
with non-negligible probability and, furthermore, we
have Succ(Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) is non-
negligible, thereby deriving a contradiction.
We show that Stuff(Π, β, κ) satisfies JCJ-verifiability by
contradiction. Suppose Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Stuff(Π, β, κ),A,
nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) is non-negligible for some k1, k3, nC ,
nV , and A. Hence, there exists an execution of the experiment
Exp-JCJ-Ver(Stuff(Π, β, κ),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) which sat-
isfies
Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P ) = 1 ∧X 6= X′
with non-negligible probability, where (BB ,X, P ) is an elec-
tion concocted by the adversary and (X′, P ′) is produced by
tallying BB . By definition of TallyS , there exists a computa-
tion
(Y′, Q′)← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3)
such that X′ = Add(Y′, β, κ) and P ′ = Q′. By definition of
VerifyS , there exists a computation
v ← Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC , Sub(X, β, κ), P )
such that v = 1. Let the adversary B be defined as follows:
given input K and S, the adversary B computes
(BB ,X, P )← A(K,S)
and outputs (BB , Sub(X, β, κ), P ). We have an execution
of the experiment Exp-JCJ-Ver(Stuff(Π, β, κ),B, nC , nV , k1,
51. Dario Catalano, personal communication, Paris, France, 10 October 2013.
52. Markus Jakobsson, personal communication, New Orleans, USA, 27 June
2013.
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k2, k3) that concocts the election (BB , Sub(X, β, κ), P ) and
tallying BB produces (Y′, Q′) such that
Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC , Sub(X, β, κ), P ) = 1
with non-negligible probability. Moreover, since X 6= X′
and Y′ = Sub(X′, β, κ), we have Sub(X, β, κ) 6= Y′ with
non-negligible probability. It follows immediately that Succ(
Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,B, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) is non-negligible, thus
deriving a contradiction and concluding our proof.
B. Proof: Proposition 10
We define key leakage before proving Proposition 10.
Definition 33 (Key leakage). An election scheme Π =
(Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) does not leak the tallier’s pri-
vate key if for all positive integers nC and nV , se-
curity parameters k1 and k3, and PPT adversary A,
we have Succ(Exp-leak(Π,A, k1, k3, nC , nV )) is negligible,
where Exp-leak(·) is defined as follows:
Exp-leak(Π,A, k1, k3, nC , nV ) =
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nV do (pk i, sk i)← Register(SKR, i, k1);1
BB ← A(sk1, . . . , sknV );2
(X, P )← Tally(SK T ,BB , nC , {pk i}nVi=1, k3);3
if A(X, P ) = SK T then4
return 15
else6
return 07
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose Π = (Register,Vote,Tally,
Verify) is an election scheme satisfying JCJ-correctness
and JCJ-verifiability that does not leak the tallier’s private
key, and Backdoor(Π) = (Register,Vote,TallyB ,VerifyB).
Since Π does not leak the tallier’s private key, the experi-
ment Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) produces a bul-
letin board BB such that SK T ∈ BB with negligible probabil-
ity, for all k1, k2, k3, nC , nV and A. It follows that an execu-
tion of the experiment Exp-JCJ-Cor(Backdoor(Π),A, nC , nV ,
k1, k2, k3) is an execution of the experiment Exp-JCJ-Cor(
Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) with non-negligible probability and,
hence, Backdoor(Π) satisfies JCJ-correctness.
We show that Backdoor(Π) satisfies JCJ-verifiability by
contradiction. Suppose Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Backdoor(Π),A,
nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)) is non-negligible for some k1, k3, nC ,
nV , and A. Hence, there exists an execution of the experiment
Exp-JCJ-Ver(Backdoor(Π),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3) which sat-
isfies
Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P ) = 1 ∧X 6= X′
with non-negligible probability, where (BB ,X, P ) is an elec-
tion concocted by the adversary and (X′, P ′) is produced
by tallying BB . If there is one and only one Y such that
(SK T ,Y) ∈ BB , then X′ = Y by definition of Tally and
X = Y by definition of Verify, otherwise, the execution of
the experiment Exp-JCJ-Cor(Backdoor(Π),A, nC , nV , k1, k2,
k3) is an execution of the experiment Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A, nC ,
nV , k1, k2, k3) and, hence,
Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Backdoor(Π),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3))
= Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3)).
In both cases we derive a contradiction, thereby concluding
our proof.
C. Proof sketch: Proposition 11
Suppose Π = (Register,Vote,Tally,Verify) is an election
scheme satisfying JCJ-correctness and JCJ-verifiability. Fur-
ther suppose Bias(Π, Z) = (Register,Vote,Tally,VerifyR),
for some set of vectors Z. By definition of VerifyR, we have
VerifyR(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P ) = 1
implies the existence of a computation
v ← Verify(PKR,PK T ,BB , nC ,X, P )
such that v = 1 with non-negligible probability, for all PK T ,
BB , nC , X, and P . It follows that
Succ(Exp-JCJ-Cor(Bias(Π),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3))
≤ Succ(Exp-JCJ-Cor(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3))
and
Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Bias(Π),A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3))
≤ Succ(Exp-JCJ-Ver(Π,A, nC , nV , k1, k2, k3))
for all k1, k2, k3, nC , nV , and A. Hence, Bias(Π, Z) satisfies
JCJ-correctness and JCJ-verifiability.
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